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ABSTRACT
The criticism of Lionel Trilling is complex in ideas and in argu­
ment, and it has yet to be studied in the context of a total vision.
His extraordinary accomplishments both as a critic and as a prose 
stylist will doubtless require years of scholarly work.
It is bcpcd that his dissertation will constitute one small step 
in the di vtJ ,ti scholars will have to move, if they are to appre­
ciate the r.srJLus of Trilling. The scope of this dissertation, in matters 
relating to what Trilling has written, has been limited to three pre­
faces which he wrote to his major critical books, The Liberal Imagi­
nation, The Opposing Self, and Beyond Culture, and to one single lecture, 
Mind in the Modern World, which he delivered in the last years of his 
life. The intention of this dissertation has also been limited to for­
mulating, out of these three prefaces, four notions which Trilling holds 
to and which constitute his critical methodology.
A careful reading of these prefaces provides the following "givens" 
which make up Trilling*s critical methodology. First of all, Trilling 
is a dialectical thinker. Reality for him resides not in the hard 
material substances of the world, nor in the shadowy subjectivity of 
the self. Yet both the world and the self are elements of reality; and 
when they are perceived in unity as dialectic, they can be spoken of as 
constituting the whole of reality, at least for man.
Secondly, the dialectic,which makes up moral, intellectual, and 
aesthetic reality, is achieved only through the imagination. The
iv
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imagination for Trilling is a constant and necessary perception of 
the world as a unity of instinct and reason, of shadow and substance, 
of self and world.
Thirdly, Trilling understands culture to be a dialectical process; 
and in the romantic tradition of the nineteenth century, he finds the 
most complete expression of what constitutes the self and what con­
stitutes culture. It is the self as the imagination which produces 
art, science, religion, and philosophy; and as these accomplishments 
flow from the imagination, they must bear the imprint of its dialectical 
powers.
Fourthly, Trilling valuates ideology as the greatest perversion of 
human knowledge. Should art, religion, and philosophy become devoid of 
dialectic, should they become formalized as the final human truths, 
they are no longer to be regarded as geniune cultural forms. They become 
what Trilling calls "ideology" because they no longer contain the crea­
tivity and energy of dialectic which flows from the human imagination.
As static forms they are identified with the residues of human thought, 
such things as habit and reflex which have nothing to do with dialectic.
These four formulations, it can be argued, provide a stance for 
approaching any of Trilling's critical essays. To support this point, 
the last chapter of this dissertation is devoted to a careful reading 
of Trilling's Mind in the Modern World in the context of Trilling's 
notions of the dialectical, of the imagination, of culture and of 
ideology.
v
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INTRODUCTION
The canon of Lionel Trilling is long, comprehensive, and 
Impressive. It Includes critical biography, fiction, textbooks, and 
criticism. The area of his work which is best known has to do with 
his criticism, and this includes such works as The Liberal Imagina­
tion, The Opposing Self, Beyond Culture, Sincerity and Authenticity, 
and Mind in the Modem World.
A cursory familiarity with any one of these books makes it 
evident how difficult it is to read Trilling— difficult, that is 
to say, in the sense that Trilling’s mind is of the highest intellec­
tual order and that everything he writes reflects a "density of 
thought." He is able to take ideas from historians, philosophers, 
anthropologists, and social scientists and embed them in his work 
with effortless skill. As he uses these ideas to illuminate lit­
erature, he accomplishes this without damaging the subtlety, pro­
fundity, and validity of the ideas. Moreover, Trilling is one of 
the last of the grand stylists. He is not intimidated by the 
pragmatic and egalitarian spirit of the world, and so his prose is 
inspired by a love of the English sentence as it was developed by 
Hawthorne and James. His use of the periodic sentence is accom­
plished with a brilliance and precision which puts to shame most 
critical writers of modem times.
1
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2Hence Trilling shuns the simple and the practical in pursuit 
of what he calls "intellectual honor." This means that as a man 
of letters, he seeks to find out the best of what has been written 
and thought, no matter how much difficulty may attend that quest.
He pursues that ideal relentlessly, but with acumen, skill, and 
complexity which run counter to the spirit of modern civilization. 
And in so doing, he creates essays that are best compared to 
labyrinthine fugues of thought, complex, beautiful, profound, and 
always achieving an ultimate unity. The complex character of 
Trilling’s thought and the consummate achievement of his style can 
be formidable problems for the person who wishes to write about 
Trilling's vision of art. The essays of Lionel Trilling do not 
yield easily to summary, and his critical judgments are contained 
in carefully developed patterns of example, qualification, paradox* 
and irony, and this of course makes them difficult to represent.
The limits of these difficulties aside, one can nevertheless 
isolate certain givens of Trilling's vision by examining the pre­
faces of The Liberal Imagination, The Opposing Self, and Beyond 
Culture. From the prefaces two important aspects of Trilling’s 
work can be discovered: first, that his criticism is inspired by 
a notion of the imagination as the chief dialectical faculty of 
the human mind. Through this faculty, Trilling suggests, man can 
achieve a valuable and cogent perception of reality and of culture. 
The second aspect of his work, which can be uncovered in these 
prefaces, is that Trilling believes in the unity of the self, an 
ideal which originates among the Greeks and which continues to be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3admired throughout the history of Western civilization. And it is 
for this reason that Trilling allies himself with the romantic 
school of poetry and criticism. He understands and approves of 
the chief aims of the romantic poets who sought unity of per­
ception through the dialectic of the imagination.
But Trilling's allegiance to romanticism is not blind, and 
whenever romanticism moves away from the dialectic of the imagina­
tion, Trilling makes certain strictures about it; this, perhaps, 
is the single value of the preface of Beyond Culture, in which 
Trilling argues that the adversary culture of the twentieth century 
has grown decadent and lost the originating sense of dialectic 
which it inherited from the romanticism of the nineteenth century.
A careful reading of these prefaces will establish the 
fundamental givens of Trilling's thought, and once they are 
established and accepted as central categories of thought in 
Trilling's aesthetic and philosophical vision, much will be gained 
by way of a stance through which Trilling's criticism can be 
approached.
For instance, no single piece of criticism in Trilling's canon 
has evoked such controversy as Hind in the Modem World. It is 
a bewilderingly brilliant essay, as complex and profound as anything 
that has ever been written in American criticism. And yet, given 
Trilling's valuation of mind as dialectic along with his esteem for 
nineteenth century romanticism, one can find in the essay an ease 
and grace which is inspired by the unity of these two central ideas.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The purpose of this dissertation is therefore rooted in 
a desire to establish a methodology for reading Trilling's criticism. 
A careful reading of his prefaces, it is hoped, will provide the 
central ideas so necessary for a more profound understanding of 
Trilling's critical essays. To establish the validity and the 
cogency of these ideas as they can be gleaned from the prefaces, 
one of the chapters of this dissertation will contain an exegetical 
reading of Mind in the Modem World in light of the dialectical 
notion of mind.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I 
THE SENSE OF THE DIALECTICAL
The canon of Lionel Trilling's work is long, comprehensive, 
and impressive. It includes critical biography, fiction, text­
books, and criticism. The area of his which is best known is, of 
course, his criticism, and this includes such work as The Liberal 
Imagination, The Opposing Self, Beyond Culture, Sincerity and 
Authenticity, and Mind in the Modern World.*
A cursory familiarity with any of these works makes it evident 
that it is difficult to read Trilling— difficult in the sense that 
the work of Wallace Stevens, or George Santayana, or Sigmund Freud 
can be spoken of as difficult. In other words, the quality of 
Trilling's mind reflects the highest kind of intellectual accomplish­
ment, and one finds in his work the most challenging quality of 
intellectual complexity. Everything which Trilling writes has the 
texture of a "density of thought." He is able to take ideas from 
historians, philosophers, anthropologists, and social scientists 
and to incorporate them in his writing with grace and seemingly 
effortless skill. Such ideas he uses to illuminate literature, and 
he accomplishes this without damaging either subtlety, profundity, 
and validity of the ideas or the literature to which he applies 
them. Moreover, Trilling is one of the last of the grand stylists.
He remains aloof from the pragmatic and egalitarian spirit of the
5
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6world, which demands that prose always be simple and without 
ambiguity. Trilling is an accomplished prose stylist, and he loves 
the English sentence as it was developed by Hawthorne and James.
His use of loose and periodic sentences is executed with a brilliance 
and precision which puts to shame most of the critical writers of 
the modem period.
Trilling’s disdain for the simple and the practical is an
2
aspect of what can be called "Intellectual honor." As a man of 
letters, inspired to a great degree by the ideal of criticism put 
forth by Matthew Arnold, he seeks to find the best of what has been 
written and thought, no matter how difficult such a quest might be.
He knows that this is an ideal, and like all ideas its realization 
is always conditioned by the frailty of intellectual effort. Yet 
Trilling pursues this aim with acumen and patience. And it is this 
very steadfastness, together with an accomplished prose style and 
a brilliant scholarship, which make his writings profound, rich, 
and labyrinthine.
These virtues, however, become obstacles for the person who 
wishes to say something fundamental about the criticism of Lionel 
Trilling. For one thing, the critical judgments which Trilling 
makes are subtly and obliquely presented only after a carefully 
and meticulously developed dialectical argument is established 
in his essay by way of examples, qualifications, speculations, 
and implications, often of a paradoxical or ironic character.
Such complexity and dialectic one is always hesitant to generalize 
about, perhaps in fear that the brilliance of Trilling’s intel­
lectual stance will be distorted or misrepresented.
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7The limits of these difficulties and fears aside, there still 
must be formulated the certain givens or fundamentals of Trilling's 
critical methodology, and perhaps they are provided by Trilling 
himself. They are to be found in a remarkable essay entitled 
"Reality in America." This study, actually the first essay compris­
ing his book The Liberal imagination, deals with such metaphysical
3
issues as reality and human perception. In the first section of
this piece, Trilling discusses V. L. Parrington and his Main
Currents in American Thought, which was once a critical history of
great influence in American criticism;' Trilling criticizes
Parrington for having an epistemology which is simplistic. For
Parrington, Trilling points out, there is a thing called "reality"
which is "one," "immutable," and "irreducible," and between reality
and human perception there can exist a happy and simple harmony,
if, and only if, the human intellect receives such reality as an
optic lens receives light, allowing it to pass through without an
essential distortion or modification. Whatever disharmony exists
then between reality and human perception must therefore be seen
as originating in the perceiver and not "reality." Reality, for
Parrington, is "always reliable, always the same, always easily 
4
to be known." So undialectical a notion of reality, Trilling 
rejects as a crude, materialistic monism. And whatever censures 
Trilling makes of Parrington are evoked by these metaphysical 
conceptions of reality which Trilling understands as simplistic 
and deterministic and incomplete. The specific weakness of 
Parrington's history and criticism is found in his notions of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the imagination, and of culture, and of the romantics, and 
Trilling makes many cogent strictures about these concepts as 
Parrington formulates them. But, as far as the purposes of this 
dissertation go, such strictures are valuable for what they say 
about Trilling. In other words, the criticism which Trilling 
writes of Parrington reaches out beyond mere negation. As such his 
strictures are taken here to be affirmations of what Trilling 
holds about the imagination, and culture and the romantics.
One of the serious weaknesses of Parrington as a historian 
and as a critic is that he suffers from a lack of the sense of 
the dialectical. Parrington, for instance, understands culture 
to be a '’confluence” or a "current,” and, in this sense, his notion 
of culture is found by Trilling to be narrow and deterministic.
Such a conception diminishes the significance of human intentionality 
in the dynamic of culture. And Trilling, in opposition to Parrington’ 
definition, sees culture as "struggle" and "dialectic" wherein the 
human personality is intimately involved with societal forms and 
ideas.^ For Trilling, then, culture is "dialectic." This is a 
rather formal way of saying that the values of culture which exist 
in art, in religion, in science, and in society are achieved not 
through the simple registration of objects or circumstance upon 
the human mind. Knowledge for Trilling always bears the imprint 
of the self because it is a mediatory act between the self and 
the conditions which surround the self. Such mediation always has 
in it contradiction, irony, and opposition, because, between the self 
and the world, there is always imaginative tension.
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9Trilling sees Parrington*s notion of the imagination as shallow 
and erroneous because he fails to see the sense of the dialectical 
as much in art as he does in culture. Parrington's attitude toward 
Hawthorne illustrates this point. Hawthorne, he complains, was an 
artist whose imagination was filled with "shadows and not the world 
of reality." For this reason Parrington judges Hawthorne harshly, 
as one who removed himself from the concrete issues of "Yankee 
reality," the substantial world of Samuel Sewall. Trilling praises 
Hawthorne for the very reason that Parrington devalues his art.
"The fact is," writes Trilling, "that Hawthorne was dealing beauti­
fully with realities, with substantial things."** For Trilling, 
Hawthorne rejects the world of simple concrete issues and goes 
beyond them for the complex moral truth of the human heart. Reality 
is more than matter; it is the self also in its moral and aesthetic 
concerns. "The man," Trilling says in defense of Hawthorne and the 
kind of imagination he represented, "who could raise those brilliant 
and serious doubts about the nature and possibility of moral per­
fection, the man who could keep aloof the 'Yankee reality’ and who 
could dissent from the orthodoxies of dissent and tell us so much 
about the nature of moral zeal, is of course dealing exactly with 
reality."^ Trilling, then, understands the imagination of Hawthorne 
to be of paradigmatic significance, because the power of his art 
resides in his sense of shadows and of matter, of the contradictory, 
of the dialectical. And for Trilling, the imagination is the 
highest cognitive power, the central mode of integrating the self, 
of unifying oppositions, and of creating new possibilities out of 
what seems absolutely causally determined.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Moreover, the life of a culture has its primal source in the
artist whose imagination is constantly engendering the dialectic of
vision. Culture cannot maintain its dialectic on its own. Should
it lose sense of the dialectic, should it be truncated from the
individuality of the selves which constitute it, it becomes a
cultural form identified by Trilling as the ideological. Only
the imagination, as it is actuated into a dialectical energy, can
resist the narrow and constricting stasis of ideology. About this
point, Trilling is quite definite, and he explains what his notion
of what the artist is, against Parrington's shallow interpretation
of Hawthorne's imagination:
And in any culture there are likely to be certain 
artists who contain a large part of the dialectic 
within themselves, their meaning and power lying 
in their contradictions; they contain within 
themselves, it may be said, the very essence of the 
culture, and the sign of this is that they do not 
submit to serve the ends of any one ideological 
group or tendency.®
The real failing of Parrington, the causal center of his
misconception of culture and of the imagination, is located in
his superficial understanding of romanticism. Parrington does
not understand that romanticism is "full of complicated but not
wholly pointless ideas, that it involves many contrary but de- 
g
finable things." Romanticism for Parrington has to do with 
romance, which for him is equated with a refusal to face the hard 
facts of reality. What he fails to see is the dialectical sense 
of life which is the essential core of romanticism, the ability 
to perceive and tolerate and even mediate opposition and contra­
dictions. Trilling defends romanticism as a powerful moral and 
intellectual tradition inspiring the great art of the nineteenth
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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century, and he sees in that art what Parrington obviously chose
not to see: that life, culture, and the self advance, not through
simple determined paths, but in the thickets of contradiction and
dialectic. Trilling then recognizes, as Parrington did not, the
powerful tradition and influence which constitutes romanticism,
particularly American romanticism:
It is a significant circumstance of American 
culture, and one which is susceptible of 
explanation, that an unusually large pro­
portion of its notable writers of the 
nineteenth century were such repositories of the 
dialectic of their times— they contained both 
the yes and the no of their culture, and,by that 
token they were prophetic of the future.
In the dialectical symbolism of a romantic art— as it then 
can be found in the writings of such authors as Hawthorne, Melville, 
and Henry Adams— one comes closer to the moral and historical 
actuality of the twentieth century than Parrington ever did, despite 
his rigid adherence to a hard, materialistic formulation of reality.
There are then three generalizations which can be formulated 
out of Trilling’s criticisms with a reasonable measure of certitude: 
the notion that culture is a dialectical process; the concept of the 
imagination as a faculty of knowledge which unifies, in dialectic, 
the opposites and the contradictions of experience into a mediatory 
unity; and the recognition of the romantic achievement as something 
more than a period of great artistic achievement, as a period in 
the history of human thought when the poets, novelists, and 
philosophers began to perceive reality and the self as dialectic, 
rather than the actualization of received tradition by the self.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In the prefaces of three of Trilling's most well known works, 
The Liberal Imagination, The Opposing Self and Beyond Culture, these 
generalizations are elaborated upon in detail and explained as 
critical principles in which there is validity and cogency. For 
this reason, Chapters II, III, and IV of this dissertation are 
devoted to a careful reading and analysis of the prefaces. Chapter
II is concerned with the preface of The Liberal Imagination; Chapter
III takes up the matter of the preface to The Opposing Self; Chapter
IV is an elucidation of the complex judgments and attitudes which 
Trilling makes on the preface to Beyond Culture. Chapter V is an 
exegesis of Trilling* s Mind in the Modern World. Such an exegesis 
is made with heavy emphasis upon these three generalizations which 
are taken here to comprise Trilling's critical methodology; the 
notion of culture as dialectic; the concept of mind as a dialectical 
process; and the romantic tradition which Trilling admires for its 
primal and originating intention— an intention of unifying human 
perception and human personality by keeping it free of the ideology 
of either a static rationalism or a protean irrationalism.
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CHAPTER I
1For a complete bibliography of Lionel Trilling, see 
Mar-tatwp Gilbert Bamaby, "Lionel Trilling, A Bibliography of His 
Writings: 1926-72," in Bulletin of Bibliography and Magazine Notes,
31, No. 1 (1974), 37-44.
2Lionel Trilling, The Opposing Self (New York: Viking Press, 
1955), p. 24.
3Lionel Trilling, "Reality in America," The Liberal Imagi­
nation (New York: Viking Press, 1950), pp. 3-21.
4Ibid., pp. 4-10.
5Ibid., p. 9*
^Ibid., pp. 7-9.
?Ibid., p. 9.
3Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 6.
10Ibid., 9.
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CHAPTER II
TRILLING’S CONCEPTION OF THE IMAGINATION
The preface to The Liberal Imagination is a brief yet provocative 
exposition of the imagination. As with much of what Trilling writes, 
it is difficult reading, and although it is Trilling's purpose to 
define his conception of the imagination, he does not actually 
formulate a definition until the very last paragraphs of the piece.
And for this reason, one must read through the entire preface and 
seek out this conclusion in order to know that the entire effort 
of the short study is devoted to the imagination.
The development of the preface consists of a series of 
reflections upon circumstances, subjects, and themes, which because 
of the brevity of the exposition appear disparate and discontinuous. 
But'when the preface is recollected around the conception of the 
imagination, which Trilling formulates in the concluding paragraphs, 
the various considerations, such as the political situation emergent 
during the years 1940-1949, the political recommendations of John 
Stuart Mill and the famous crisis of his early life, and the genetic 
relationship between feeling and thought, fall into place and achieve 
a marvelous unity.
Turning away from the preface for a moment, and looking at the 
essays which comprise the main contents of The Liberal Imagination, 
one finds a distinction which Trilling makes between ideology and 
ideas. Such a distinction is of invaluable assistance in following 
Trilling’s thoughts as he writes of the evolution of the imagination
14
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in the nineteenth century, and as he persuades his readers of its
continued relevance in modern times. Ideas for Trilling are "living
things, inescapably connected with out wills and desires, . . .
susceptible of growth . . . showing their life by their tendency to
change."^ On the other hand, ideology "is not the product of thought
it is the habit or the ritual of showing respect for certain formulas
to which, for various reasons having to do with emotional safety,
we have very strong ties of whose meaning and consequences in actu-
o
ality we have no clear understanding."
In the beginning of the preface of the Liberal Imagination, 
Trilling expresses concern about the ascendancy of liberalism in 
America during World War II and the years which followed it. Him­
self a liberal, Trilling yet regrets that "at this time liberalism
3
is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition."
He is apprehensive about the fate of the conservative tradition,
which, if it can be said to exist at all, defines itself not through
ideas, "but only in action or in irritable mental gestures which
4
seek to resemble ideas."
The imminent evil which is contained in such a circumstance 
has to do with the absence of opposition, a conservative opposition, 
which Trilling fears that in becoming devoid of intellectual energy 
does not merely leave liberalism unchallenged, but places before 
it the temptation to become apathetic and self-complacent. Trilling 
suggests that the triumph of liberalism may bring its decline, from 
a political vision of thought, feeling, and energy into another 
ideology.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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As it turns out, Trilling sees tragic consequences for either 
liberalism or conservatism, in the absence of a dialectic between 
them. A conservatism, which does not derive its powers from ideas, 
suffers a terrible retrogression, because, once a movement despairs 
of ideas, it falls back upon more primitive modes of expression, such 
as force, "which it masks in ideology."^ Moreover, a liberalism 
which has no opponent will find its ideas becoming "state, habitual, 
and inert,and, of course, as these are the qualities of ideology, 
one concludes that Trilling sees liberalism as suffering a devolution 
as tragic as conservatism. Trilling is therefore fearful of ideology; 
for him it is the worst kind of cultural pathology because ideology is 
a response through which men seek to escape the dialectic and conditioned 
character of human experience.
No one, according to Trilling, understood better what the 
loss of an opposition of high intelligcence could mean for a political 
party than John Stuart Mill. Indeed, ML11 once prayed, in the manner 
of a serious jest, that his political partisans always be graced with 
enemies of powerful intelligence: "Lord, enlighten thou our enemies 
. . .; sharpen their wits, give acuteness to their perceptions and 
consecutiveness and clearness to their reasoning powers. We are in 
danger from their folly, not from their wisdom: their weakness is 
what fills us with apprehension, not their strength."^
The chief evil attendant upon a liberalism which is without 
opposition is its final metamorphosis from a vision of ideas into 
an ideology. And that is why, Trilling continues, Mill advised
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liberal partisans to read Coleridge, the archconservative of 
the nineteenth century, and "to become familiar with his powerful
Q
conservative mind." The quality of Coleridge's mind was marked 
by such subtlety and profundity that it could engender a pressing 
intellectual dialectic and hence counteract against the lethargy 
and over-confidence which frequently accompanies political and 
intellectual ascendency.
In the advice which Mill gives to the adherents of his 
political philosophy, Trilling finds a validity which was good not 
only in a particular political construct of the nineteenth century 
but which is also equally valid for modem times. A devil's 
advocate, such as Coleridge, is hard to come by, and Trilling 
raiderstands this, but in want of such an opponent, Trilling 
suggests that if there is no respectable devil's party, then it 
falls upon one to create his own demon. Trilling emphasizes the 
importance of dialectic, whether it be from external opposition or 
from a scrutiny achieved within, because only through a constant 
examination and criticism of ideas can one resist the staleness, 
the inertia, and the habit of ideology.
Generally it is a romantic paradigm of mind which Trilling 
holds to. All thought originates in feeling. In other words, 
there is a continuum between thought and feeling. Hence Trilling 
writes, "Goethe says somewhere that there is no such thing as a 
liberal idea, that there are only liberal sentiments,"^ and he 
makes it apparent that he agrees with Goethe's statement by 
following it with a succinct affirmation: "This is true."^"® Yet
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Trilling does not believe that feelings are the sole measure of
truth, or that they cannot mislead men as much as intellect. Indeed
the difficulty is that feeling can become part of ideology as much
as ideas because as Trilling points out "certain sentiments consort
only with certain ideas and not with others. Moreover sentiments
are susceptible to the unconscious processes of mind: "What is more,"
Trilling says, "sentiments become ideas by a natural and impercep- 
12
tible process.” While this may be a "natural thing," it makes for 
a reciprocal complexity in human cognition, and Wordsworth understood 
this profoundly, Trilling suggests, when the poet wrote "'Our continued 
influxes of feeling are modified and directed by thoughts, which are 
indeed representatives of our past feeling.
Culture, also originates in feeling: "And Charles Peguy said,
'Tout commence en mystique et finit en politique*— everything begins 
in sentiment and assumption and finds its issue in political action 
and institutions."^ This is a judgement with which Trilling is also 
in accord, but again he qualifies it: "The converse is also true: 
just as sentiments become ideas, ideas eventually establish themselves 
as sentiments."^ And so what Trilling emphasizes here is that 
in culture, as in the mental life of the individual, there is a 
tendency for feelings to be subsumed into ideology.
The whole issue raised in the paragraph approximates the 
ambiguous relationship of the self to ideas and to culture, and 
like Matthew Arnold, Trilling believes feeling to be the primal 
energy of the self which makes for freedom and creativity. But 
the great difficulty comes in discriminating between what these
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primal and creative energies of the self are and In deciding to
what extent they are validly represented by culture and ideas in
general. In Sincerity and Authenticity. Trilling quotes Arnold’s
poem, which is a brilliant rendering of the contradiction attendant
upon feeling and thought:
Below the surface— stream, shallow and light,
Of what we say we feel— below the stream,
As light, of what we think we feel— there flows
With noiseless current strong, obscure and deep,
The central stream of what we feel indeed.16
Recognition of the complex dynamic between feeling and ideas,
between feeling and culture has, for Trilling, greatest significance
for art and politics: "if between sentiments and ideas there is a
natural connection so close as to amount to a kind of identity, then
the connection between literature and politics will be seen as a very
immediate one."-^ To grasp this intimate relationship between the
two, one must accept not the narrow "but the wide sense of the word 
18politics." The politics of today, essentially free of the more
exclusive loyalties such as church and nation, is essentially "the
politics of c u l t u r e . S u c h  politics Trilling defines as "the
organization of human life toward some end or other, toward the
modification of sentiments, which is to say the quality of human
life."^® In making this point, Trilling reformulates the word
"liberal," which he tells his readers "defines itself by the quality
21of life it envisages, by the sentiments it desires to affirm."
Hence it is evident, that, at this point in the preface, what 
Trilling means by the liberal imagination is something which goes 
beyond particular political interests, at least in the sense of
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having to do with a specific liberal tradition or party. For
this reason Trilling argues that a writer of literary criticism
22
must involve ’'himself with political considerations." Here 
Trilling corrects the impression that some may have that The 
Liberal imagination is a collection of political essays. "These are 
not political essays," he tells his readers, "they are essays in 
literary criticism. But they assume the inevitable intimate, if 
not always obvious, connection between literature and politics."
To take literature as a sister discipline of politics requires, 
Trilling continues, "no great ingenuity, nor any extravagant manip­
ulation of the word literature," other than "beyond taking it in 
the large sense specified, of the word politics.There are other 
reasons for doing so: the careful eye with which "certain governments" 
hold over the matter of literature and the censorious measures which 
they take, if it is not consonant with their political vision, is 
commonplace knowledge in modem Western experience. Also those of 
the "New Criticism" who insist upon the autonomy of art and would 
resist the political interests of literary criticism, Trilling 
continues in advancing his argument, ignore that the writers of 
the last hundred and fifty years "have in one way or another turned
their passions /italics mine/, their adverse, critical, and very
25
intense passions, upon the condition of the polity. And iron­
ically, in so doing, they have explored the nature of selfhood in a 
manner relating to the culture of politics that does "not controvert
but rather support/s/ the statement about the essential commitment 
,,26
to politics.
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In discussing these matters, such as the distinction between
ideology and ideas, the necessity of dialectic in the cultural
and political life of man, the complex dynamic between thought and
feeling, and the natural identity between literature and politics,
Trilling seems to have taken his readers far afield. But in the
concluding pages of the brief preface, he turns again to Mill,
whose life and work is symbolic and illuminative of the various
paradoxes of culture and politics. From his earliest days Mill was
brought up in a political tradition, actually a political ideology,
which he was led to believe constituted his very identity. Suffering
from an intense melancholic disorder, which almost brought him to
suicide, Mill came to understand that his pathology was engendered
by the "Liberal, Utilitarian principles of B e n t h a m . W h a t  he
learned about Utilitarianism was that, although it was founded upon
generous and noble aims, it attributed too much efficacy to the
intellect; which, from the point of view of Bentham, was the sole
means of dealing with the world and of gaining happiness. For
Trilling it is part of Mill’s genius that he perceived that it was
this political ideology which was crippling his emotional life and
doing violence to his person:
From the famous "crisis" of his youth he had learned, 
although I believe he never put it in just this way, 
that liberalism stood in a paradoxical relation to the 
emotions. The paradox is that liberalism is concerned 
with the emotions above all else, as proof of which 
the word happiness stands at the very center of its 
though, but in its effort to establish the emotions, 
or certain among them, in some sort of freedom, 
liberalism somehow tends to deny them in their full 
possibility. Dickens’ Hard Times serves to remind us 
that the liberal principles upon which Mill was brought 
tip, although extreme, were not isolated and unique, and
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the principles of Mill's rearing very nearly destroyed 
him, as in fact they did destroy the Louisa Gradgrind 
of Dickens' novel.
The story of Mill's crisis, of how through a heroic effort of 
intellect and will, he regained possession of himself by reading 
Wordsworth and Coleridge is told by Mill himself in his auto­
biography. That crisis and its resolution has come to assume a 
classic significance for students of romantic literature. In 
reading Coleridge, who both as a philosopher and a poet, was
opposed to the mechanical view, Mill gained more than "a private
29
emotional advantage," though that in itself was considerable since 
it helped him to accomplish what Louisa Gradgrind could not accomplish: 
the overcoming of suicidal inpulses.
What Mill learned, in addition to returning to those primal 
sources of feeling from which he had been separated since childhood, 
was something about the very character of knowledge, something which 
he grasped as the power of Coleridge's politics and metaphysics, some­
thing which went beyond mere opposition. It was that Coleridge's
30
metaphysics and politics "were a poet's" and that being a poet's,
they had a unity and comprehensiveness which bespoke "a sense of
0*1
variousness and possibility." As such the ideas of Coleridge 
contained something which Utilitarianism either lost or was actually 
not in possession of to begin with.
Hence Mill, in disenthralling himself from an ideology, learned 
something profound, not just about himself, but also about the 
insufficiencies of his intellectual life. He came to understand 
that any intellectual experience, like any political system, must
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be comprehensive of variety, freedom, and possibility. Without 
such a basal and informing sense of perception, any ethical, 
political or metaphysical vision dwindles into a prosaic vision of 
life or becomes an ideology.
The profundity of Trilling's observations, as he finds them 
in Mill's life and makes of them a universal standard in conduct of 
mind, can be measured by the esteem which two of the greatest 
thinkers of the twentieth century have held for the poets. Sigmund 
Freud^ once proclaimed that it was not he, but the poets who had 
discovered the unconscious, and Martin Heidegger virtually shocked 
the philosophers by. turning to the matter of the poets rather than 
creating what others expected he would offer the world, and that
O O
was,according to William Barrett, "a new system of metaphysics." 
Contemporary liberalism, according to Trilling, has fallen
A/
to this tendency to become "prosaic." While it avowedly does not
depreciate "emotion in the a b s t r a c t , i t  moves toward a state
in which "the conscious and unconscious life of liberalism are not 
36
always in accord." In the actualization of its vision, it falls
37into the pattern "of any other human entity1,' unconsciously limit-
38ing "its view of the world to what it can deal with." (For an
interesting parallel between this observation and one which the
distinguished psychoanalyst Eric H. Erickson has put forth in matters
39
of religious and political ideology, see the accompanying footnote. )
As a consequence it "unconsciously tends to develop theories and prin­
ciples, particularly in relation to the nature of the human mind"^® 
that justify its limitations. Contemporary liberalism repeats 
what to Trilling is a "characteristic paradox"^ in any great
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vision which springs from the "primal imagination"^ whereby exists 
and is established "the essence and existence"^ of imaginative 
vision. Trilling writes, "in the interest that is of its vision 
of a general enlargement and freedom and rational direction of 
human life— it drifts toward a denial of the imagination. And in 
the very interest of affirming its confidence in the power of mind, 
it inclines to constrict and make mechanical its conception of the 
nature of mind.
In refusing to become an Empedocles who is consumed by his 
own intellectual monism, and in recognizing the necessity of the 
imaginative life of Callicles, Mill, inspired by Coleridge, under­
stood that every man should judiciously seek his own demon, if he 
is to achieve that coup rehens ive dialectical vision of life which
emerges in the marriage of heaven and of hell. He achieves what
4 5
Trilling would call "a sense of variousness and possibility
by understanding that emotion and imagination must be allowed to
war with intellect:
Mill, to refer to him a last time, understood 
from his own experience that the imagination was 
properly the joint possession of the emotions and 
the intellect, that it was fed by the emotions, 
and that without it the intellect withers and dies, 
that without it the mind cannot work and cannot 
properly conceive itself. I do not know whether 
or not Mill had particularly in mind a sentence 
from the passage from Thomas Burnet's Archaeologiae 
Philosophicae which Coleridge quotes as the epigraph 
to The Ancient Mariner, the sentence in which Burnet 
says that a judicious belief in the existence of 
demons has the effect of keeping the mind from 
becoming "narrow, and lapsed entirely into mean 
thoughts," but he surely understood what Coleridge, 
wanted to enforce by that quaint sentence from
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Burnet what is the general import of The Ancient 
Mariner apart from any more particular doctrine 
that exegesis may discover— that the world is a 
complex and unexpected and terrible place which is 
not always to be understood by the mind as we use 
it in our everyday tasks.
Instincts and reason Mill came to understand as the consti­
tutive element of the human psyche, and they are the elements which 
must be made to intermingle and be balanced by the dialectical powers 
of the imagination. And the imagination, so comprised, is the 
reconciling agency of mind which deals with the unpredictability of 
external circumstances, in other words,the world, and the vicissitudes 
of the instincts as they exist in each human personality. And the 
necessity of dialectic which Mill stumbled upon and which inspired 
him to appreciate the imagination as "the joint possession of 
emotions and the intellect," is also appreciated by Trilling as a 
valid means of approaching a world which is "complex, unexpected 
and terrible," a world which "is not to be understood by the mind 
as we use it in our everyday tasks."
In tracing so central a conception of what Trilling means 
by the imagination, it is perhaps inevitable that one should ask 
what influence Freud has had upon Trilling’s conception of the 
imagination. While it would be rather unfair to say that Trilling 
is a Freudian critic, it would be accurate to say that the influence 
of Freud upon Trilling has been profound indeed. In one of the 
essays contained in The Liberal Imagination. Trilling writes: "The 
Freudian psychology is the only systematic account of the human mind 
which, in point of subtlety and complexity, of interest and tragic
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power, deserves to stand beside the chaotic mass of psychological 
insights which literature has accumulated through the centuries."^ 
This is a strongly affirmative statement, and its relevance to the 
psychology of the imagination cannot be ignored.
Harold Bloom writes of the imagination and of Freud: "Imagina­
tion, as Vico understood and Freud did not, is the faculty of self- 
preservation, and so the proper use of Freud, for the literary 
critic, is not to apply Freud (or even revise Freud) as to arrive 
at an Oedipal interpretation of poetic history."^® Whatever the 
relation of the critic to Freud may be or should be, Trilling 
would disagree with Bloom insofar as he charges that Freud did not 
understand the imagination as "the faculty of self-preservation." 
Trilling would argue instead that Freud did not have at hand the 
aesthetic language to express this function of the imagination, 
but he understood the conception in an implicit way, much as Keats 
understood Freud's tripartite notion of mind.
In Freud and the Crisis of Culture, Trilling writes of Keats:
When he /Keats/ says truth is beauty, he is putting 
into words his enormously complex belief that the self 
can so develop that it may, in the intensity of art, or 
meditation, perceive even very painful facts with a kind 
of pleasure, for it is one of the striking things about 
Keats that he represents so boldly and accurately the 
development of the self, and that, when he speaks of 
pleasure, he may mean— to use language not his— some­
times the pleasure of the id, sometimes the pleasure 
of the ego, and sometimes the pleasure of the super­
ego."^
The converse, Trilling could be saying of Freud. That is, when 
Freud speaks of the ego as the mediating aspect of mind and when 
he equates the ego as the continuous dialectic achieved between
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two powers of the mind— the id with its inexorable, instinctual 
energy and the superego constituted of the ideal and abstract 
notion of culture— he is articulating in different terms what 
Trilling and Mill define as the imagination: the union of Instinct 
and reason, a dialectic achieved within, but not uninfluenced by 
the contingencies and the vicissitudes of life.
It is interesting and perhaps convenient for the purposes of 
this chapter that Keats should be mentioned. In the last essay of 
The Liberal Imagination, which is entitled "The Meaning of a Literary 
Idea," Trilling cites an excerpt of Keats from "Sleep and Poetry."
While it is an epigraph to the essay, it is no doubt intended to explain 
what Trilling means by the liberal imagination:
. . . Though no great minist'ring reason sorts 
Out the dark mysteries of human souls 
To clear conceiving: yet there ever rolls 
A vast idea before me, and I glean 
Therefrom my liberty
That "clear conceiving" can be taken as the intellect, and the
"dark mysteries of human souls" can be equated with the instincts,
the feelings. The "vast idea" is the imagination, which "ever rolls"
in dialectic strife and unity, which is ever changing and yet which
is the means whereby the self is delivered from enslavement: enslavement
to feeling, enslavement to abstractions and enslavement to self.
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CHAPTER III
THE PREFACE TO THE OPPOSING SELF; A HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE SELF AND OF CULTURE
The maimer in which Lionel Trilling thinks and writes is one 
which does not yield easily to category or to source. The dis­
position of his mind is learned, analytic, synthetic, as the occasion 
may require, and these elements are embodied in his criticism in 
many ways. This manner of thinking and writing, if it can be appro­
priately spoken of as such, presents difficulties enough, as one seeks 
to describe his work, but there are even greater difficulties to be 
encountered, as one seeks to find a center in his thought, a stance, 
from which all of Trilling’s criticism might be approached. One 
can speak of the classical humanism of T. S. Eliot or the psycho­
logical criticism of I. A. Richards, and have confidence that these 
terms are reasonably accurate approximations of their interests as 
critics. The case is somewhat different with Trilling for, while 
Trilling is committed to a specific paradigm of mind, his writings 
are free from any wish to affirm his philosophical or metaphysical 
commitments. Should he mention an idea of which he approves or to 
which he has given his approval, he does so with such spontaneity that 
unless the reader is motivated by an interest in Trilling's philosophical 
values, the idea will hardly be recognized as basic in Trilling's 
thought.
31
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Yet, in spite of these difficulties, Trilling's work is 
dominated by an interest in the nature of the self, and this concern 
appears frequently enough in his writings to be considered the central 
motif of his thought. Once recognized as such, it becomes an in­
valuable touchstone for approaching his work. Trilling is fascinated 
with the self as personality, as will, and as consciousness, as it 
exists in its uniqueness, apart from society and the external world 
and yet in these very circumstances or conditions with which the 
self is always confronted.
In broadest philosophical terms Trilling makes a distinction 
between the self and the world. In the uniqueness of the self 
he finds a power that must of necessity make it separate from any­
thing else, from, as one says, the world. And this distinction 
between the self and the world cannot but remind one of the same 
distinction which Emerson makes in some of his essays. In fact, 
Emerson’s distinction between the self and the world can serve as a 
valuable analogue of Trilling’s vision, provided, of course, that the 
differences as well as the likenesses which exist in such a comparison 
are borne in mind. In "Nature," Emerson writes of the self and of 
its relation to the world: "Philosophically considered, the universe 
is composed of Nature and the Soul. Strictly speaking, therefore, all 
that is separate from us, all which Philosophy distinguishes as the 
NOT HE, that is, both nature and art, all other men and my own body, 
must be ranked under this same, NATURE."^ And what Emerson attributes 
to the self is to be understood as autonomy, and an autonomy of the 
highest order.
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Similarly, Trilling, in his essay on William Dean Howells, 
distinguishes the self from the world, if not in the same terms, 
yet certainly with the same intention: "Yet it is to be seen that 
those conditions to which we do respond are the ones which we our­
selves make, or over which we have control, which is to say conditions 
as they are virtually spirit, as they deny the idea of the conditioned.
Somewhere in our mental constitution is the demand for life as pure 
2
spirit." The self for Trilling, as for Emerson, is to be considered
in its unconditioned aspect, in its apartness from all that does not
partake in unconditioned spirit. All which is other than the self,
all which Emerson establishes as the "other" and enumerates as nature,
art, men, and even the physical body, Trilling also accepts as
phenomena to be distinguished from the self, though he does not
denominate them as Emerson does with the term "Nature," but uses the
more conventional metaphysical term, the "conditioned." In fact, here,
the similitude between Emerson and Trilling is such in point of
specificity that Trilling associates the body with conditioned being in
much the same manner as Emerson: "Certainly the power of shaping is
more intimately connected with what Plato calls the 'spirited’ part
of man, with the will, while observation may be thought of as springing
3
from the merely 'vegetative' part."
Emerson and Trilling are therefore alike in their distinction 
between the unconditioned character of the self and the conditioned 
being of the world. (Trilling's terms are here preferred to those 
of Emerson, because they have a certain validity and clarity as conven­
tional philosophical terms, although Emerson's distinctions are to be
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admired because he defines them in a manner which is both concrete and 
thorough.) But Emerson and Trilling differ in their conception of 
what constitutes the relationship between unconditioned being and 
conditioned being. For Emerson, the self and the world are ultimately 
one, separated from each other through accident and circumstance, and 
certainly not through essence. What is more, for Emerson, the self 
has an inward power of restoring unity between the self and the 
world.
The opposite is the case for Trilling. The self is separated 
from the world in an absolute and final way, though this is not 
necessarily a regrettable thing, since the self needs the conditioned 
character of the world to define itself, to give it an identity. In 
his essay on Howells, Trilling shows a certain admiration for Shelley 
as he moved toward a precise formulation of the relationship of the 
unconditioned spirit of the "plastic11 self to the resistant world 
of conditioned spirit: "But the plastic stress of spirit is of the 
will in the sense that it strives against resistance, against the 
stubbomess of what Shelley called the dull, dense world— it compels 
'all new successions to the forms they wear.' But Shelley's descrip­
tion of the act of creation suggests that the plastic will cannot 
possibly exercise itself without the recalcitrance of stupid literal 
matter."^
This struggle, then, of the self against matter, against the 
conditioned being of the universe is for Trilling, as it is not for 
Emerson, a natural and inevitable phenomenon, even though Trilling
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describes it as "man’s tragic fate." It is a struggle that is not
to be despised or avoided as such because it is the struggle which 
establishes the identity of the self. The dialectic between the un­
conditioned being of the self and the conditioned being of the world 
is the surety of human experience, and to deny it is to pervert 
human experience. And one of Trilling's most intense apprehensions 
about the life of the mind is the contemporary impulse to deprive 
thought of its dialectical energies:
But when we yield to our contemporary impulse to 
enlarge all experience, to involve it as soon as 
possible in history, myth, and the oneness of spirit—  
an Impulse with which, I ought to say, I have 
considerable sympathy— we are in danger of making 
experience merely typical, formal, and representative, 
and thus of losing one term of the dialectic that goes 
on between spirit and the conditioned, which is, I 
suppose, what we mean when we speak of man's tragic 
fate. We lose, that is to say, the actuality of the 
conditioned, the literality of matter, the peculiar 
authenticity and authority of the merely denotative.
To lose this is to lose not a material fact but a 
spiritual one, for it is a fact of spirit that it must 
exist in a world which requires it to engage in so 
dispiriting an occupation as hunting for a house.
The knowledge of antagonism between spirit and 
the conditioned— it is Donne's, it is Pascal's, it 
is Tolstoi's— may in literature be a cause of great 
delight because it is so rare and difficult; beside 
it the knowledge of pure spirit is comparatively 
easy.
Unlike Emerson, Trilling does not seek to reconcile the self with 
the world; for the unconditioned essence of the self is manifested, 
developed, and expressed in its dialectic with the conditioned. It 
is not of the essence of human experience to be resolved in unity; 
human experience for Trilling is the constant exchange between the 
conditioned and the unconditioned.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
Thus, what is gained from this comparison of Trilling and 
Emerson is a specific sense of Trilling's metaphysical conception 
of the self in its relation to the world. Trilling, like Emerson, 
is committed to the autonomous character of the self. The self, for 
Trilling, is not to be delivered from its uniqueness; nor does it 
seek to make its unconditioned character consonant with the conditioned, 
which it is not. The ultimate value of the self for Trilling 
is its ultimate resistance to all which it is not; whereas, for 
Emerson the ultimate value of the self resides in its potency for 
unity with the universe.
The comparison between Emerson and Trilling also brings into
focus the difficulty of discussing Trilling’s notion of the self.
When writing of the self, Trilling uses a number of terms: the self
is sometimes spoken of as "the modern imagination"; at other times
the self is equated with the "will"; and, on other occasions, the self
is described as "intentionality." The liberty with which Trilling
describes the self can present problems, if one wishes to formulate
a precise idea of his paradigm of the self. Hence, the phrase
"unconditioned being," a term which Trilling casually uses in his
discussion of the self, is to be appreciated because it is possessed
of generic quality which can include various terms of Trilling's 
6essays.
As a conventional metaphysical term, the notion of unconditioned 
being gives a certain stability, even it might be said, a certain 
specificity to his conception of the self. This stability, this
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specificity is derived from a common meaning which certain phi­
losophers have assigned to the term. But the term also has a natural 
and inevitable flexibility, flowing from the very nature of the 
concept as an abstract notion. The- term can subsume a number of 
aspects in which the self may be unconditioned: unconditioned in 
its aspect as "will,” unconditioned in its aspect as "imagination," 
unconditioned in its aspect of "intention."
As has already been suggested, the phrase "unconditioned being" 
is to be admired because it is comprehensive enough to include all 
of those external phenomena, such as culture, fate, politics, and 
even, as will be seen later, the unconscious mind, with which Trilling 
sees the self in dialectic. It should be said, however, that one does 
not find as much difficulty in attempting to formulate a general notion 
of those elements with which the self can enter into a dialectic— or 
at least as much trouble— as one encounters in attempting to formulate 
Trilling’s various interpretations of the self. This is because there 
is perhaps not really so much a need for such a formulation; the aspect 
of conditioned being with which Trilling is usually, though not always, 
interested in is culture, although in his later criticism there is to 
be found an interest in the phenomena of death and fate as the condi­
tioned. Yet the term "conditioned being," like its sister term 
"unconditioned being," is to be held on to, because as a philosophical 
construct it can provide both the flexibility and the specificity 
which makes for a clear and coherent discussion of the complex, dia­
lectical manifestations of the self.
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A demonstrated instance of the lucidity and grace which the
terms can bring into a discussion of Trilling is to be seen in their
application as dominant concepts in his work, even when it is most
7
abstruse, as, say, his preface to The Opposing Self. This preface, 
brilliant, elegant, and profound, is an account of the notion of the 
self and culture as it is found in the imaginative writing of the 
nineteenth century, but it is also abstruse and complex, and hence 
very difficult to read. And without what mi"*’*- be called the genetic 
notions of unconditioned and conditioned being, the full import of the 
essay, its brilliant structure together with its interpretations, 
distinctions, comparisons, and subtleties, are hard, if not impossible 
to come by.
In that preface, Trilling considers the writings of certain 
artists, novelists, philosophers, and poets of the nineteenth century 
and shows how in their work, they made clear the path for the ascend­
ancy of a new conception of self, whose origin is at the end of the 
eighteenth century and whose nature is to be distinguished from any 
other self in the history of Europe. Each writer interpreted the 
self in different circumstances and in different aspects, yet each 
writer understood that this new self was possessed of a hitherto un­
realized power of shaping its own destiny and the destiny of the 
culture in which it existed.
Throughout the preface, Trilling is concerned with the self 
that "emerges” at the end of the eighteenth century and which becomes 
the preoccupation of poets, novelists, and philosophers during the 
nineteenth century. That self, Trilling asserts, "is different in
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kind, and, in effect, from any self that had ever before emerged."
It is different in kind in that its highest creative-powers of mind are 
attributed to the imagination, and it is different in effect as it consigns 
to itself an intellectual and moral authority which had hitherto been 
delegated to society. In this sense, the central artistic and philoso­
phical traditions of the nineteenth century can be spoken of as revolu­
tionary. No longer is society invested with those absolute institutional 
powers upon which the self was once in dependence for its intellectual 
and moral identity. Instead, it is society which is now made subordinate 
to the scrutiny and shaping power of the imagination, and it is the imagi­
nation which is now recognized as the most subliminal and sovereign aspect 
of self. About this self and its new attitude toward social reality, 
Trilling is quite definite. He states: "It is different in several 
notable respects, but there is one distinguishing characteristic which
seems to me pre-eminently important: its intense and adverse imagination
9
of the culture in which it has its being."
In writing of the self in its new relation to the communal life, 
Trilling uses the word "culture" rather than the more conventional term 
"society." The term "culture" is to be preferred, Trilling explains, 
because "society" is limited by a sense of what is ideal and accomplished 
in the social order; or to put it another way, "society" calls to mind 
all of those artistic and scientific accomplishments to which the community 
gives it unambiguous assent. On the other hand, culture is more compre­
hensive of the contradictory and ambiguous character of social effort, and, 
as such, includes "not only . . .  a people’s achieved works of intellect 
and imagination but also . . . its mere assumptions and unformulated
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valuations," alongside its "habits, its manners, and its super­
stitions."^
It is here, precisely here, as Trilling explains his preference 
for the word "culture," that he refers to matters which suggest the 
relevance of the phrase "conditioned being." For, to the extent that 
"assumptions," "unformed valuations," habits," "manners," and "super­
stitions" are not under the control of the conscious will, so can one 
speak of these things as being a measure of the conditioned aspect of 
the will. In this regard Trilling actually refers to the involuntary 
aspects of the communal life as the "unconscious portion" of culture. 
And, as the self, through the power of imagination, perceives this 
"unconscious portion" of culture, its responses maybe properly described 
as partaking of the "conditioned." This concept is suggested when 
Trilling writes: "The modern self is characterized by certain powers 
of indignant perception which, turned upon the unconscious portion of 
culture, have made it accessible to conscious thought.
Charles Dickens, Trilling points out, was astutely aware of this 
unconscious element of culture. In the novel Little Dorrit, Dickens 
created characters whose selves are imprisoned by this unconscious 
dynamic of culture. Trilling begins his observation by noting that 
Little Dorrit, like so many other imaginative works of the nineteenth 
century, is dominated by the image of the prison. This preoccupation
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with the prison is not extraordinary, Trilling continues, since
"the new age was signalized by the fall of a very famous prison,
12the Bastille," and since the memory of the Bastille reminded men 
not only of the gross injustices and irrationalities from which they 
had suffered but also of the wrongs and inequities from which they 
were still suffering. But what is extraordinary is that the prison 
came to symbolize something more than mere physical incarceration:
"But as soon as the Bastille had fallen, the image of the prison came 
to represent something more than the gross injustices and irra­
tionalities. Men began to recognize the existence of prisons that 
were not built of stone, nor even of social restrictions and economic 
disabilities. They learned to see that they might be immured in some 
ways more frightful because it involved their own a c q u i e s c e n c e . " ^
What Trilling is describing here might be called the phenomenon of 
"a second prison," more "frightful" than what one ordinarily under­
stands a prison to be because of the subtle and oblique conditioning 
of spirit brought about by the "second prison." It can be denominated 
thus because its architecture is not built of bricks and stones and 
its keepers are not endowed with the traditional powers of incarcerative 
authority and force.
The "second prison" is far too intangible, far too subtle a mode 
of incarceration for that; its powers do not flow from the architecture 
of a building, nor from the vigilance of wardens and keepers. It 
can be said to have an architecture, then its architecture is built 
of "mere assumption and unformulated valuations," and also of "habits,
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manners, and superstitions." Its prisoners are its keepers, a circum­
stance brought about by the innate propensity of self to condition its 
own being: "The newly conceived.force required of each prisoner that 
he sign his own lettre de cachet, for it had established its prisons in 
the family life, in the professions, in the image of respectability, in 
ideas of faith and duty, in (so the poets say) the very language 
itself."14
Upon this hidden enigma and apparent contradiction in the human 
psyche, the second prison thrived, until the poets, philosophers, and 
the novelists of the nineteenth century uncovered this aspect of 
conditioned existence. The uncovering of this hidden phenomenon of 
mind does not lessen the dignity of the self; indeed, with the develop­
ing perception of culture as "the second prison" emerges a new conception 
of self which Trilling calls "the modern self." Hence Trilling writes: 
"The modem self, like Little Dorrit, was b o m  in a prison. It assumed 
its nature and fate the moment it perceived, named, and denounced its 
oppressor."1'* Nor did this newly achieved identity lessen the importance 
of culture; as the modem self entered into dialectic with culture, 
it Infused into culture a dialectical energy which made it "living":
"And by this act it brought into being not only itself but also the idea 
of culture as a living thing with a fate of its own, with the possibility, 
and the necessity, of its own redemption."1^
Trilling thus admires Dickens for the aesthetic rendering of 
one of the adverse relations which the modem self has with "the culture 
in which it has its being." That adverse relation can be broadly under­
stood as that moment of history in which the self awakens to a par­
ticular aspect in which it is conditioned. In his perception of this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
view, Dickens did not merely engender more awareness of the new 
conception of self; he also foreshadowed what Freud would later 
describe as "introjection," an infantile tendency of the human psyche 
to incorporate authority and culture into its very being, as a young 
child takes food, without thought or discrimination.3-^
Quite naturally, as the self perceives its unconscious or un­
willed affiliation with culture, it can he said to become emancipated 
or unconditioned. It is enabled to perceive and to reject those elements 
of culture to which it has given an inadvertent assent. Culture too 
thereby gains freedom as it receives from the unconditioned self, 
new forms, perceptions and energies. As the self unconditions itself 
from "the unconscious portion" of culture, it also unconditions culture: 
it delivers it from the stasis of being a merely received tradition.
Trilling then turns to Hegel and finds in his writings, in spite 
of their heavy, speculative character, the most complete explication
of "the strange, bitter, dramatic relation between the modern self and the 
18
modem culture." To this end Trilling says of Hegel: "It was he who
first spoke of the 'alienation' which the modem self contrives as a
means for the fulfillment of its destiny, and of the pain which the
19self incurs because of this device of self-realization.” Trilling 
finds it of credit to Hegel that he understood in a very formal way 
the new character of the modem self and the relationship which it 
would henceforth have to culture. He understood that the modem self 
would no longer exist in a passive relationship to society, that its 
new character would relect energy and aggressiveness, will and intention.
In his understanding of the new powerful role of the modem self, 
Hegel was astutely aware of the complex dynamic which would henceforth
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comprise culture. The modern self, with its new moral and intel­
lectual authority, now moving in dialectic with culture, is a steward 
of culture. Culture will be valued as much as, and perhaps more than, 
ever because it is perceived as a phenomenon coming not from tradition, 
not from the church, nor from government, but from the creative wills 
of men. Hence, when Hegel speaks of the "terrible principle of culture, 
he is referring, Trilling implies, to the awesome responsibility which 
has fallen upon the modern self as it shapes and determines its own 
life and the life of culture as well.
A second admirable accomplishment of Hegel, as Trilling observes, 
in this matter of formulating "the bitter and dramatic relationship 
of the self to culture," is to be found in the philosopher’s under­
standing of the role of the imagination and of art in modern culture. 
Given the acclaim and recognition which the modern self in its new 
autonomy is now accorded, the moral notion of a community becomes only 
one aspect of the criterion for judging a culture, whereas before it 
had been the sole criterion. Style, and the personality from whence 
comes style, will be given much consideration in the judgment of a 
culture. As Trilling explains Hegel’s new interpretation of the 
self and culture in relation to personality:
Hegel understood in a remarkable way what he believed 
to be a new phenomenon of culture, a kind of cultural 
mutation. This is the bringing into play in the moral 
life of a new category of judgment, the category of 
quality. Not merely the deed itself, he said, is now 
submitted to judgment, but also the personal quality 
of the doer of the deed. It has become not merely 
a question of whether the action conforms to the 
appropriate principle or maxim of morality, but also 
of the maimer in which it is performed, of what it
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implies about the entire nature, the being, of the 
agent. This is what Hegel had in mind when he insti­
tuted his elaborate distinction between "character" 
and !*personality," the latter term having reference 
to what we might call the manner and style of the 
moral action.21
Thus, from the point of view which Hegel formulates here, it is 
personality of self under the aspect of the imagination which is 
accorded as much a significance as the moral ideals and accomplish­
ments of culture.
Hence, art, as one of the most intimate, the most personal
expressions of the human disciplines, is given an almost sacramental
importance. Hegel was profound in his understanding of the new
dominion which art will assume in the moral life:
His perception of this new mode of judgment Hegel 
in part derived from his reading of the new lit­
erature of his day, and it was one of the things 
that led to his giving to art an importance quite 
without precedent in moral philosophy. For Hegel, 
art is the activity of man in which spirit expresses 
itself not only as utility, not only according to 
law, but as grace, as transcendence, as manner and 
style. He brought together the moral and the aes­
thetic judgment. He did this not in the old way of 
making morality the criterion of the aesthetic: on 
the contrary, he made the aesthetic the criterion 
of the moral.^2
Insofar as Trilling admires Hegel’s description of the modern 
self and its new relationship to culture, it can be said that 
Trilling equates the self with the imagination. And the imagination, 
which Trilling calls "the spirit" in the foregoing quotation, is 
that aspect of the unconditioned in man which enables him to go 
beyond the law and assists him in his own style of selfhood.
Trilling’s conception of the imagination as selfhood can be 
compared to that moment of manner and grace in the life of Emily 
Dickinson when she startled the very conventional Colonel Higginson
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by greeting him with a daylily in her hand and asked him one of
the most profound questions of the law. That question, one now
understands, could not have been asked by Emily Dickinson had she not
been born in a Puritan tradition. In asking Higginson, "What is home?"
she put to him a question with which every serious person with religious
leanings inevitably is concerned. But the coyness and subtlety of the
manner in which the question was asked marked it with a manner and
style of the most intense selfhood. In asking this question of the
law, she transcended the law; she created the style and grace of her
23selfhood in the cold, iron New England air.
Trilling brings his discussion of the modem self into focus 
in the final pages of the preface with a consideration of the critidism 
and the poetry of Matthew Arnold. What Trilling finds remarkable in 
Arnold is his ability to write about this new, complex dynamic of the 
self in its relation to culture with a comprehensive simplicity. Arnold 
is remarkable, Trilling contends, because he achieved a comprehensive 
sense of the Zeitgeist without having read Hegel, and one suspects 
here that Trilling is hinting that in this case ignorance proves to 
be a virtue, because Arnold's writings have a simplicity and clarity 
about them free of the seductively abstract quality of Hegel's writings.
In Trilling's interest in Arnold as a critic and a poet, there is 
a certain inevitability, because Arnold, more than any other Victorian 
writer, was consistently and formally preoccupied with the relation of 
the self to culture, and because Arnold's poetry is suffused with the 
poignancy, suffering, and terror of the alienated self.
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"Matthew Arnold said of literature that it was a criticism 
of life," Trilling tells his.readers in the preface,^ and the 
statement has been a source of constant irritation to many modem 
critics, the most distinguished of whom is T. S. Eliot. Of Eliot's 
taking Arnold to task for defining literature in such a manner, there 
is, Trilling admits, a measure of justice, in that the definition is 
not without excess. In the preface to the Sacred Wood, Eliot chastises 
those who are in sympathy with Arnold's vision of art by observing that 
the statement could never be accepted by anyone who has felt the 
"surprise" and "elevation" of a new experience of poetry.
But Trilling concedes to Eliot only on this point, that the 
statement is extravagant. Having admitted this excess, he then proceeds 
to rescue Arnold from the charge of obtuseness to the surprise and joy 
of poetry. His defense of Arnold is magnificent, for he vindicates 
Arnold without resorting to the harsh polemic that too often character­
izes the quarrels of modem literature. He turns the tables on Eliot, 
obliquely, by using the harsh, strictive phrases of Eliot in exposition 
of Arnold's intention when he extravagantly defines literature as a 
criticism of life. Yet Trilling's intention is no mere effort to 
reconcile Arnold's vision of literature with Eliot's conception of 
the experience of poetry. When he reassesses Arnold's definition in 
the light of Eliot's harsh words, Trilling wishes his readers to become 
aware of Arnold's profound understanding of the conditioning elements 
of culture which is, in short, to be associated with the notion of the 
"second prison." For this reason Trilling writes:
of Arnold's having called poetry a criticism 
of life Mr. Eliot observed that "no phrase can sound
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
more frigid to anyone who has felt the full surprise 
and elevation of a new experience of poetry." This 
may be true, and perhaps Arnold*s phrase needed to be 
roughly handled because it seemed to license a dull 
way of reading poetry. But if now, after the passage 
of a good many years, we look again at the words Mr.
Eliot used to discredit Arnold's phrase, we see that 
they actually serve to explicate and to justify it.
They tell us precisely in what way Arnold thought 
that poetry was a criticism of life. Surprise and 
elevation; set the words over against Arnold's sense 
of our life in culture, against his sense of modern 
culture as a kind of prison (so he called it) and we 
know very well what Arnold meant. ^
It is here, just here, as Trilling refers to what has been
called "the second prison," by which is meant the notion of culture
as psychic imprisonment, that Trilling speaks of the "right condition
of self.’1 What Arnold understands to be "the right condition of self"
has to do with those experiences possessed of the freedom and
creativity of the unconditioned;
The "frigidity" of his phrase could not have been 
wholly lost on Arnold himself. When he said that 
poetry was criticism— which in any ordinary meaning 
it so obviously isn’t— he meant to shock us. He 
meant to say that in our modern situation the sur­
prise and elevation of poetry can serve to bring some 
notion of what is the right condition of self— in 
general, and not merely when it is having the experi­
ence of poetry. He was proposing to us the idea that 
our culture is hostile to surprise and elevation, and 
to the freedom they imply. ^6
Here the suggestion is that poetry, or some imaginative endeavor 
such as poetry, can engender in the self an awareness of its un­
conditioned character and can help the self to distinguish between 
mere habit in culture and conscious choice. And all of this, of 
course, parallels what the philosopher Hegel understand about the 
modern self and culture.
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This, then, is what Trilling means when he suggests that Arnold 
said much the same thing that Hegel did about the modern self, but 
that he said it in a much "simpler" way. Arnold, like Hegel, under­
stood how a culture, or at least a certain aspect of culture, could 
imprison the soul, and he also saw the sacramental role which the 
imagination henceforth must play in order to give the moral life the
possibility and spontaneity it must have, if it is to be genuine human
experience.
As far as what one might call the conclusion "proper" of the 
preface goes, it is not Arnold the critic in whom Trilling shows 
interest, but Arnold the poet. Of all Matthew Arnold's poetry, it is 
"The Scholar Gypsy" which Trilling singles out as the most significant 
of Arnold's poems, at least from the point of view of a critic 
interested in the modem self. In this connection, Trilling writes of 
the poem: "And yet there isn't, I think, a more comprehensive and
comprehensible delineation of the modem self in its relation to the 
culture than that which Matthew Arnold makes in his elegy for his own 
lost youth.
The myth of the Scholar Gypsy is derived from a folk legend, 
interesting in its own right. The Scholar Gypsy, a student at Oxford 
in the fifteenth century, left the university before the completion 
of his studies because of hard financial circumstances. This pre­
mature ending of the Scholar Gypsy's student days at Oxford, Trilling 
does not perceive as tragic since he took with him a sense of joy and 
a vision of the whole life which he never lost as his fellow students
iateer did. Though his peers are fortunate in being able to complete
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their studies, they are unfortunate in that the very fulfillment 
of their scholarship brings them into a life where they are no longer 
able to nourish the joy, spontaneity, and vision of their student 
days.
The Scholar Gypsy, prevented from completing his studies and 
consequently excluded from one of the conventional stations of culture, 
nevertheless keeps what others have lost: a youthful enthusiasm, an 
energetic and visionary pursuit of the whole life of the imagination, 
unattenuated by duty of a conventional kind. Thus, in his loss, the 
Scholar Gypsy gains, as he travels still, in Arnold’s time and by 
implication forever, among untrodden paths, among unorthodox men, 
in pursuit of truth. The bars of the second prison will never cir­
cumscribe his existence, for he has escaped the conditions of mere 
duty, mere assumption in culture.
The Scholar Gypsy escapes, Trilling tells his readers, the fate 
of Wordsworth’s free-ranging boy upon whom the shades of the prison 
are about to fall "like a weight. / Heavy as frost and deep almost as 
life." But he gains also, like Whitman’s Paumanok boy, "The boy 
ecstatic," that intensity of selfhood which is "the hardest basic 
fact, and only entrance to all facts." Hence, the Scholar Gypsy 
gains his identity in the enduring life of the imagination even 
though he is alienated from the unconscious "portion of culture." The 
Scholar Gypsy is, as Trilling interprets him, "imagination, impulse, 
pleasure: he is what every writer of the modem period conceives, the 
experience of art projected into the actuality and totality of life 
as the ideal form of the moral life. His existence is intended to
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disturb us and to make us dissatisfied with out habitual life in
28culture, whose nature his existence defines." As the embodiment 
of the imagination and of art, activities of the self which can never 
be mere duty, mere assumption, and mere habit, the Scholar Gypsy 
symbolizeis the new relation between the self and culture, in which the 
self is affirmed through its "contrived alienation" and assumes not 
only a destiny of its own, but the destiny of culture as well.
But "The Scholar Gypsy" is also to be appreciated for a reason 
other than its "comprehensive delineation of the modern self in its 
relation to culture." Another aspect of the poem to which Trilling 
calls attention is seen in its actuality as literary tradition and as 
legacy. In his intense veneration for Arnold, William Butler Yeats 
visited Oxford with the expressed purpose of making a pilgrimage to the 
ford where, in Arnold's poem, the Scholar Gypsy was once seen.
Trilling quotes from a letter of Yeats in which that pilgrimage is 
described, and he thus provides historical evidence, of a most charm­
ing kind, that Yeats upheld an almost religious reverence for the 
vision of self put forth in "the Scholar Gypsy." In so doing, there 
is to be seen, after all of the charm of the letter is put aside, a 
profound act of acceptance, a receiving of legacy, all of which makes 
for the continuity and growth of literary tradition.
Thus the self which emerges at the end of the eighteenth century 
and which gains its ascendancy in the nineteenth century goes on to 
survive in the twentieth century, in the interests and affections of 
William Butler Yeats. And of Yeats’ interest in "The Scholar Gypsy,"
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Trilling makes this observation for those who would understand modern
culture and the modem self: "The poem, of course, is a prefiguration
of Yeats’ whole career; it gives us the terms of his long quarrel with
the culture, which, more than anything else, made his passion and his
selfhood. Such quarrels with the culture we recognize as the necessity
29
of not only the self but of Culture."
The preface is closed with an affirmation that the self of the
late eighteenth century is the modem imagination:
I have dealt in these essays with more novelists 
than poets, but of course the novelists in their own 
way of particularity and circumstantiality are no 
less committed than the poets to the modem imagi­
nation of autonomy and delight, of surprise and 
elevation, of selves conceived in opposition to the 
general culture. This imagination makes, I believe, 
a new idea in the world. It is an idea in the world, 
not in literature alone. If these essays have a 
unity, it is because they take notice of this idea, 
and of course of its vicissitudes, modulations, and 
negations.
And there one has it, the center, the stance of Trilling’s 
criticism. The self which Trilling is most interested in is the 
imagination. It is the imagination as a manifestation of the ton- 
conditioned nature of the self, but it is also the imagination as it 
exists in the dialectics of art and culture. The importance which 
Trilling assigns to the self as imagination and as the dialectical 
source of culture is indisputable. It is this conception of the self 
with which this dissertation will be most concerned— the self as the 
imagination and as the dialectic between the conditioned and the 
unconditioned.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PREFACE TO BEYOND CULTURE: A STUDY OF CULTURE WITH AND WITHOUT
DIALECTIC
In the preface to The Liberal Imagination, Trilling formulates 
his definition of the imagination. Through the imagination, the 
inward and outward worlds meet in dialectic. The imagination syn­
thesizes and enriches human experience by making it comprehensive of 
both the world of human desire and the world in all of its actualities, 
its vicissitudes, and its complexities. The imagination is the shaping 
power of the self and derives its identity from a willed dialectic 
between instinct and reason. As the imagination draws its energies 
and individuating powers from the desires and feelings of the self, 
it counterpoises them upon the abstract domain of the self which exists 
in tradition, culture, and past experiences. Out of this struggle 
between thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and emotions emerges a 
dialectic which reveals the dignity of selfhood and themystery of the 
human person.
Trilling writes again of the imagination in the preface to 
The Opposing Self; but, in this instance, he studies the imagination 
in its historical and philosophical development. Here, he recognizes 
not only the debt which modem culture owes to the romantic artist
55
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and certain philosophers of the nineteenth century in making men 
aware of the autonomy of the.self, but he also writes admiringly of 
those Romantics who attributed authority and responsibility to the 
imagination as the faculty of grace and self-determination, of 
creativity and liberty, of political and social destiny.
This concept of the self— in its autonomy, in its imaginative 
and dialectic powers— is found in the writings of the poets, novelists, 
and philosophers of the nineteenth century, all of whom revealed in 
their work an adverse awareness of their society. Unhappy with the 
unconscious influence and coercion which society exercises upon the 
individual, they grew indignant with the culture in which they were 
situated, and they called for a separation of the self from society.
The separation of the self from societal forms and the consequential 
relegation of culture to a secondary role marks an achievement of 
monumental importance in the history of man. Henceforth, the self 
is understood to be the primal source of culture, and, as such, the 
validity of a culture is measured by selfhood. Such a development 
made for one of the greatest and most productive epochs of literary 
achievement, and Trilling sees the adverse spirit of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century as its inspiriting source.
In the preface to Beyond Culture, Trilling studies the fate of 
the adversary spirit— which is here taken to mean the cultural move­
ment of the nineteenth and early twentieth century as it is expressed 
in the art and thought of such writers as Keats, Wordsworth, Arnold, 
Mill, and Freud as well as In the continuance beyond the first quarter 
of the twentieth century. His purpose in doing this goes beyond giving
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an account of later development of the adversary spirit. He is 
also interested in understanding culture in its relationship to 
the self, which is now, as a consequence of nineteenth century 
thought, considered to be the primal and originating source of 
culture.
Trilling now speaks of the adversary spirit as the adversary
culture, and this term is used to include both the earlier and later
development of the culture. The aim of the adversary culture, in
both its early and later days, remains the same. It has to do with the
liberation of the individual from the tyranny of his culture and the
recognition and acceptance of the autonomy of the self. He would have
his readers understand that the earlier adversary culture is marked by
a distinct originality whereas he judges the later to be of a more
derivative and imitative character:
What I am calling the modem period had its beginning 
in the latter part of the eighteenth century and its 
apogee in the first quarter of the twentieth century.
We continue the direction it took. The former energy
of origination is very much diminished, but we still
do continue the direction: the conscious commitment to 
it is definitive of the artistic and intellectual 
culture of our time. It is a belief still pre-eminently 
honored that a primary function of art and thought is 
to liberate the individual from the tyranny of his 
culture in the environmental sense and to permit him 
to stand beyond it in an autonomy of perception and 
judgment.^-
In the early days, the adversary culture, particularly as it mani­
fested itself in art, was possessed of a powerful dialectic in which 
individuals of artistic and philosophical genius struggled against 
the tyranny of culture in pursuit of the liberation of the self. A 
catalogue of significant figures in the early adversary culture— such
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
as Wordsworth, Keats, Flaubert, Hegel, Arnold, Hill, and Freud— bears 
powerful witness to the success of the movement in terms of trail- 
blazing creativity and profound originality. But, as the adversary 
culture continues beyond the first quarter of the twentieth century 
and as it grows in number and organization, it becomes dispossessed 
of its energy of origination, its creative and dialectical tension, 
its elements of actual adversary will and imagination. A roll call 
of the adversary culture today may account for the presence of many 
gifted individuals, but it will not contain poets like Keats and 
Wordsworth, critics like Arnold, philosophers like Mill and Hegel, 
and students of the mind like Freud. The dialectical currents of 
the adversary culture are attenuated, and the adversary culture has 
assumed the traits of what it was once opposed to: the unconsciousness 
and habits of ideology.
This adversary culture, then, has about it the qualities of an 
ideology, yet it is important to realize that Trilling is spare in 
his use of the word throughout the preface— only later, in his con­
cluding paragraphs, does he state unequivocally his fear that the 
adversary culture is on its way to becoming an ideology. His hesitancy 
to use the term is, no doubt, explained by his great esteem and his 
implied confidence that the values of the adversary movement, though 
now embedded in an ideology, are nevertheless possessed of great 
relevance for the life of the mind and of culture.
The transformation of the adversary culture into a species of 
thought which is narrow and static in its character cannot be said
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to have happened suddenly, nor can It be said to occur without 
anticipation. Indeed, it can even be viewed as a phenomenon which 
is marked by a certain inevitability and even naturalness; although, 
Trilling, deeply aware of this leaning, cautions his readers about 
accepting this as a rationale in the study of ideas, lest they accept 
ideology as something inescapable. Perhaps one point which he makes in 
a rather casual way, but which bears great relevance to the contemporary 
situation, is that the intention of the adversary culture— if one can 
conceive of culture as being possessed of an intention, and Trilling 
clearly does— has remained essentially unaltered, even though it is 
embedded in a narrow and static culture form at its present time. Circum­
stances, and not any intrinsic insufficiency of character nor any error 
in primal intention, make for the difference between the early and 
later adversary culture.
The circumstances to which Trilling refers here are explained 
as having to do with what presumably might be called the dynamics of 
the "group." Indeed, here the term "group" is a matrix concept, and, 
as such, the key to understanding the preface as a whole. The adversary 
culture, as with any cultural movement, achieves its influence and 
its identity through the dynamics of the group. However, the group 
which is found in earlier stages of the adversary culture is quite 
different from the group which Trilling speaks of as now representing 
the adversary influence.
The group which Trilling describes Keats as being associated 
with in The Opposing Self was small and spirited, and it was made up 
of a few brilliant men who, except for a certain unity achieved through
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common political sympathies, were quite individual in their notions 
of philosophy and of art.. Other shared interests sustained the 
identity of this group (one of which was their belief in the autonomy 
of self), but these other common bonds should be understood as emerg­
ing spontaneously in the dialectic of their art and their personalities
In no way is this group similar to the "populous group" which
Trilling describes as emerging between the first quarter of the
twentieth century and the present. The character of this group, for
one thing, is such that its members take for granted the idea of the
adversary culture; moreover, as a "populous" group there is more
"coherence," over and against whatever internal conflicts it might have
so that Trilling thinks of it "as a class," with "common interests
and presuppositions" and the kind of efficiency attributed to an 
3
institution.
Hence, the adversary group now has about it the quality of a 
class, and Trilling argues that "the present position of the university 
. . . tells us much about this new state of affairs."^ From this point 
of view, one can perceive the class structure of the adversary group 
by ‘tracing how it now advances itself by enlisting the aid of the 
most conservative of institutions— the university. The intimacy 
between the adversary group of these later days and the university 
is such that, when Dr. Clark Kerr, former president of UCLA, conceives 
of the day when the university "shall provide a commodious place" for 
"pure creative effort," not only does his prophecy prove itself belated 
but also the expressions of fear which his statements evoke from those 
most concerned about the autonomy of art are, in view of the actualities
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of the times, embarrassing anachronisms."* Trilling observes that both
the prophecy and the fears are out of joint with time:
No one who knows how things now really stand is
afraid of the university. Dr. Kerr’s prophecy 
is but a reasonable projection into the future 
of a condition already established and regarded 
with satisfaction by those who might be thought 
to be most jealous for the freedom of art and 
thought.6
In former times, the university "figured as the citadel of 
conservatism, even of reaction."^ It was an institution of a kind 
which resisted the conduct and the style of the changing world,
until they proved to be of enduring value. It might be said of
the university that there was once something of a monastic character 
to it— not in the pejorative sense of the word, but in its honorific 
connotations. The university was once resistant to the world, even 
to brilliant and valid innovations until they had established them­
selves to be of substance and of value. In an almost formal way, a 
young man who chose the academic life as his profession was thought 
of as "having given up the fight." He was, so to speak, removing 
himself from the immediate interests of culture, from, as the religious 
would say, the world. "It was known," Trilling writes,
that behind what used to be called its walls and in 
its ivory towers reality was alternately ignored and 
traduced. The young man who committed himself to an 
academic career was understood to have announced his 
premature surrender.^
Today, such a choice leaves no such impression since the relationship
between the university and the world is one of accord and harmony.
The young man who accepts an academic position is no longer considered
unworldly. "Now," Trilling writes,
it is scarcely possible for him to be so intransigent
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that the diversity cannot be thought the proper field 
for his undertakings. Between the university and 
reality there now exists the happiest; most intimate 
relation.^
The evidence of this new and intimate relationship between the
university and the adversary culture is detected by a certain kind of
criticism coming from within the university itself. This critical
process can be identified in part by its power and its acceleration
as well as by its ability to bring about rapid changes in opinion. The
process is marked by the kind of activity which the university in former
days would have eschewed. Mr. Harold Rosenberg, Trilling writes, has
made a study of this phenomenon and singled out the singular effects of
such criticism. Trilling describes Rosenberg*s findings in a manner
that is almost humorous, although for Trilling its ultimate significance
is not to be taken lightly:
Objects that at once moment are not to be thought of as 
deserving inclusion in the category of art are at 
another moment firmly established in the category; 
criticism can also reverse this process, and our most 
cherished works of art (Mr. Rosenberg gives as examples 
the paintings of Michelangelo, Vermeer, Goya, and 
Cezanne) can, if an "extreme ideology" so decides, be 
made "not art" and may even come to seem "creatures of 
darkness.
The process, in itself, according to Trilling, is not new; taste for 
the past two hundred years has "increasingly come under the control 
of criticism." But the acceleration of this process is a symptom of 
what is new about this critical process, adroitly formulated by 
Rosenberg as the "making and unmaking of art." And what is actually 
unprecedented is the agency, the central instrumentality through which 
the adversary group exerts its influence. Art is "made and unmade" in
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the "hands of university art departments and agencies which derive
from them, museums and publications," all of which carry out the
intention of the adversary culture in the activity of the group.^
The university, in its new circumstances, has become a measure
and a symbol of to what extent the effort of the adversary culture
has been successful in its conquest of "its old antagonist, the
middle class." And, while its victory has not been absolute, its
gains have been impressive. It may not dominate the middle class;
but, as Trilling observes, "it has detached a considerable force from
12the main body of the enemy and has captivated its allegiance."
The transformation of the adversary culture is brought about by
circumstances such as the one having to do with the university, and
Trilling makes this point quite clear when he writes:
I cite the changed character of the university 
as but an example, although a particularly striking 
one, of the new circumstances in which the adversary 
culture of art and thought now exists.-*^
These circumstances are engendered by those involved in the adversary
culture and, hence, whatever evil attends those circumstances should
be spoken as a moral one, as literally being "of the will." This is,
no doubt, why Trilling writes: "The change has come about, we may say,
through the efforts of the adversary culture itself."^
Therefore, from Trilling’s point of view, the early adversary
spirit, which inspired the art and the literature of the nineteenth
and early twentieth century, has become part of a class struggle.
As the adversary culture succeeds in detaching a considerable force
from the middle class, it takes on the characteristics of a class— the
kind of class to which, in its earlier days, it was in such strong
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opposition. As it assumes the structure of a class, as it becomes
a group with the characteristics of a class, Trilling observes of
it, that, as in any other class, it has developed characteristic
16habitual responses to the stimuli of its environment.
To some degree, this whole phenomenon is predetermined by a 
certain inevitability which can be found in the patterns of history: 
vision seems always to resolve itself in reconciliation and synthesis; 
yet toward this development of the adversary culture, as it now assumes 
the structure of a class, Trilling maintains an ambivalent attitude:
The situation calls for at least a little irony.
Given the legend of the free creative spirit at war 
with the bourgeoisie, it isn’t possible to be wholly 
grave as we note, say, the passion that contemporary 
wealth feels for contemporary painting. But not more 
than a little irony is appropriate. For how else are 
civilizations ever formed save by reconciliations that 
were once unimaginable, save by syntheses that can be 
read as paradoxes? It is often true that the success 
of a social or cultural enterprise compromises the 
virtues that claimed our loyalty in its heroic, hopeless 
beginning, but there is a kind of vulgarity in the easy 
assumption that this is so always and necessarily. ^
Therefore, despite the inevitability of a vision becoming a class
and increasing into numbers, these developments, Trilling says, must
still be resisted on the grounds that the easy acceptance of them
caters to the human inclination for Intellectual sloth.
Trilling seems to suggest that this is particularly true of 
the adversary culture, because, once it begins to advance itself as 
a class, a peculiar ambiguity follows it, relative to its central 
ideal which has to do with the autonomy of the self. As the most 
powerful creative movement of the nineteenth century, the adversary 
culture wrought a turbulent dialectic out of which the self is accorded
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an authority over the cultural forms of not just nineteenth century 
tradition, but, by extension, any tradition as well. Yet, it would 
seem that in its ascendency as a "populous group," so organized as 
to be thought of as a class, the subtle and fine spiritual temper
of the adversary culture has become changed into a tradition with
its own intolerance and prejudices.
It is here, just here, that Trilling makes quite clear what
his purpose is in Beyond Culture, when he writes, in reference to the
essays of the book, that
we cannot count upon the adversary culture to sustain 
us in such efforts toward autonomy- of perception and 
judgment as we might be impelled to make, that an 
adversary culture of art and thought, when it becomes 
well established, shares something of the character of 
the larger culture to which it was— to which it still
is— adversary, and that it generates its own assumptions
and preconceptions, and contrives its own sanctions to 
protect them.-*-®
Trilling puts his discussion into good order by considering two 
kinds of interrogation which are associated with the adversary move­
ment culture. The early adversary movement was inspired by a very 
profound question which generated or prompted its creative and pioneer­
ing spirit. The artists, the poets, and the philosophers of the early 
adversary culture constantly asked themselves, "Is it true? Is it true 
for me?"^ This is not an easy question to ask, and the answer which 
each individual arrives at may well be the preliminary to a monumental 
accomplishment of art or philosophy but only after he experiences 
the pain, anguish, and isolation of finding out what is true for him.
But, as the adversary culture grows in numbers and in power, it inevitably 
displaces this question by another one, which Trilling calls "the
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characteristic question of our adversary culture," meaning, of course,
20contemporary adversary culture. This question is formulated as "Is 
it true? Is it true for us?" It is a question which is asked, not by 
one person, but by a number of persons, and by implication the kind 
of persons whose interests have to do with a class. Trilling is not 
unsympathetic to the motives behind such a question, and he says of 
it: "This is a good question too, it has its particular social virtues, 
but it does not yield the same results as the first question, and it 
may even make it harder for anyone to ask the first question." And 
here the ambivalence of Trilling toward the adversary culture, and 
indeed toward culture in general, achieves focus. Trilling appreciates 
and accepts the necessity and inevitability of a concern for the communal 
good, for the "us" of civilization which human beings, as citizens of 
culture, must inevitably take up as their responsibility, but he also 
realizes that the very character of this communal good is not sympathetic 
to the subtler and more complex expression of the self in its individuat­
ing and creative moments. The first question Trilling assigns exclu­
sively to the interests of the genius, the thinker, the originator, 
whereas the second question belongs to the theoreticians and technicians.
The distinctive contrast between the accomplishments of Freud 
and the assimilation of his insights into the practical and therapeutic 
science of the psychiatrists represents and specifies the difference 
between the force of the first question and that of the second:
The difference between the force of the two questions
is suggested by the latter part of my essay on Freud.
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The second question is asked by the group of 
psychiatrists to whom I refer; it serves an 
unquestionably useful purpose. The first question 
was asked by Freud himself.
Consequently, Trilling is resigned to the inevitability that the 
adversary genius of Freud must become the matter of theoreticians 
and technicians for purposes of the common good, yet he holds to a 
wist of regret that this should be so. Perhaps his tolerance is 
inspired by the constancy of purpose of both Freud and his disciples, 
for truth remains a steadfast interest for both Freud and the psy­
chiatrists who follow him.
Yet, when Trilling considers the relationship of art to the
adversary culture, in the aspect "of the assumptions and preconceptions
of the adversary culture by reason of the dominant part that is played 
23in it by art," Trilling shows anything but tolerance. Art, par­
ticularly as it is inspired by the adversary intention to keep men 
free of assumption and of habit, should never assume the character 
of an ideology. Moreover, what Trilling finds most culpable about 
modern art— and it will, be seen that he is referring to modern art 
as it defines itself as one of those infamous "groups"— is that its 
present aims are far .removed from anything resembling the quest for 
truth. Indeed, Trilling reveals a disdain almost platonic in character, 
and his strictures against modern art are surprising even to Trilling 
himself:
Several of the essays touch on the especial diffi­
culty of making oneself aware of the assumptions and 
preconceptions of the adversary culture by reason of 
the dominant part that is played in it by art. My 
sense of this difficulty leads me to approach a view 
which will seem disastrous to many readers and which, 
indeed, rather surprises me. This is the view that
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art does not always tell the truth or the best kind 
of truth and does not always point out the right way, 
that it can even.generate falsehood and habituate us 
to it, and that, on frequent occasions, it might well be 
subject, in the interests of autonomy, to the scrutiny 
of the rational intellect. The history of this faculty 
scarcely assures us that it is exempt from the influ­
ences of the cultures in which it has sought its devel­
opment, but at the present juncture its informing 
purpose of standing beyond culture, even an adversary 
one, may be of u s e . 24
The intimate relationship of art to the imagination, as contrasted to 
the relationship of science to the imagination, is the grounds for demand­
ing the very highest standards of art, even when art advances its vision 
through the group. Although Trilling recognizes that artists may some­
times identify themselves as a group, he would look long and hard upon 
such a group who asks the question, "It is true? Is it true for us?"
By Trilling’s standards, such a group of artists could, though not 
necessarily, lose sense of that much treasured "I" of the great inter­
rogation, "It is true? Is it true for me?" and that would mean that the 
dialectical powers of art are endangered by the habits and the un­
consciousness of ideology. But an even more hazardous evil attendant 
upon the formation of an artistic group is the possibility of losing 
interest in the kind of truth which both questions formulate as the end 
of the individual and the group. Such a development, Trilling sees as 
tragic and intolerable. And, in the later development of adversary art, 
where rationality is conspicuously denied a place in the dialectic of 
artistic efforts, this is precisely the case: the notion of truth is in 
fact being dismissed or ignored as a necessary element in human experience.
This tragic absence, Trilling illustrates, by studying two relatively 
new meanings of the word "experience." To this end, Trilling quotes Lawrence 
in a statement he made about art: "'The world doesn’t fear a new idea. It
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can pigeonhole any idea. But it can’t pigeonhole a new experience.*"
Of this statement, Trilling observes that it now "has canonical authority
in our adversary culture," but he also notes that the statement "does
indeed tell us much of what that culture, in its great days, intended in
25the way of liberation, in the way of autonomy." Trilling deliberately 
juxtaposes Lawrence's criterion of experience with the notion of experience 
which those committed to the adversary culture derive from him.
The experience which Lawrence sought and had, Trilling under­
stands to be good, imaginative, dialectical, and judicious. As such, they 
involved a thoughtful and often painful rejection of a cold and assuming 
rationalism which was disjoining of body and soul. The suffering, the 
agony, and the discipline of Lawrence's experiences are identified by 
Trilling with the kind of dialectic between mind and emotion which con­
stitutes the mystery of selfhood. Such experiences occur only when the 
person who undergoes them asks of himself that profound question of the 
early adversary spirit. "Is it true? Is it true for me?" and these 
experiences, so Trilling would argue, were whole experiences, engaging 
Lawrence's entire selfhood; they were filled with a profound energy of 
though and choice which was the consequence of an astute knowledge of the 
self and the external world:
By an experience Lawrence meant, of course, an 
experience of art, and, we may suppose, of such 
art as derives from an experience of life. Lawrence's 
saying suggests that the experience speaks, as no idea 
ever can, to the full actuality of the person who 
exposes himself to it, requiring him to respond in an 
active way; by that response he is confirmed in his 
sense of personal being and its powers, and in the
possibility of a u t o n o m y . 26
Yet, the truth achieved from such experiences, according to Trilling,
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was not intended to become a universal norm of conduct: "If Lawrence’s 
statement is true, surely its truth pertains to a situation in which 
the artist is alone and in which his audience is small and made up 
of isolated individuals."^
For the artist "alone” and a "small group of isolate individu­
als," Lawrence presented a dialectic in resistance to the particular 
cultural abstraction and values of his day. This is the truth of his 
experience; this is what was true for him. It is certainly true for 
the multitude of groups who use the rhetoric of Lawrence’s statement 
but misunderstand its central meaning. Lawrence had new experiences 
which, in the circumstances of his day, required that he affirm the 
actuality of the instinctual and the affective life of the self and, 
given his situation, there was an undeniable validity to the in­
dignation and rage he expressed against the unconscious portion of 
culture. In the adversary culture today, it would seem that such 
a direction has been isolated in such a way as to suggest that the 
non-rational aspects of human personality are now taken as the norm 
of human experience. This penchant for the nonrational, Trilling 
identifies as an ideology, a commitment to a protean irrationalism 
as narrow and destructive as the static rationalism of the eighteenth 
century against which the adversary spirit was conceived by the artists 
and poets of the nineteenth century. As intellect was once given 
intemperate precedence over emotions in the eighteenth century,
"sex, violence, madness, and art itself" are now assigned a similarly 
excessive significance of "ideational and ideological status. °
As Lawrence’s adherents increased in number, and the isolated 
few who constituted his audience became the many of classes, the letter
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of his vision, and not his spirit became the paradigm of "experience." 
It was "new experiences" which Lawrence wished for men to have, and 
not his experiences. Trilling is in accord with Rosenberg's con­
tention that the painting of contemporary culture suffers from an 
implied lack of originality: "Thus, is the process of making and un­
making art that Rosenberg describes, it is plain that experiences of
painting, even of a very intense kind, submit quite docilely to being 
29pigeonholed." This group of whom Rosenberg writes are, in Trilling's 
view, representative of the many "groups" avowedly committed to the 
adversary culture who organize themselves "around an experience that 
constitutes an effective pigeonhole, with the result that the de­
marcation between experience and idea that Lawrence took for granted
30
as clear and certain is now hard to discern."
Trilling ends the preface to Beyond Culture with a recommendation
which focuses upon the present weakness of the adversary culture:
In our adversary culture such experience as is re­
presented in an proposed by art moves toward becoming 
an idea, even an ideology, as witness the present 
ideational and ideological status of sex, violence, 
madness, and art itself. If in this situation the 
rational intellect comes into play, it may be found 
that it works in the interest of experience.31
Here what Trilling suggests is that the adversary culture is too
much dominated by the particular aims with which the adversary
spirit began and not with the general overriding intention of the
movement as a philosophical position. While Trilling, it is important
to understand, holds fast to the originating spirit of the adversary
culture, he still has confidence in the adversary intention, as it
is understood, not in its contemporary development, but as it is
found in its earlier manifestations. Indeed, Trilling wishes to
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reaffirm the central spirit of the adversary movement, which has> 
as its chief end,a self, liberated in autonomy and freedom. He 
wishes for a strong and creative sense which can stand within and 
beyond culture. Such selfhood does not preclude culture or the 
continuity of culture, as culture is the medium through which selfhood 
moves and expresses itself. What Trilling seeks is a strong and 
creative self which can stand within and beyond culture.
Selfhood, understood as dialectic, particularly in its mani­
festations of the imagination, must, of necessity, resist the kind of 
perdurability associated with a class. As the imagination is a mediatory 
power, moving between instincts and reason, between the needs and 
perception of the human person and the communal interests of culture, 
it can never rest in the finalities of convention and tradition.
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CHAPTER V
AN EXEGESIS OF MIND IN THE MODERN WORLD IN THE LIGHT OF TRILLING'S
CONCEPTION OF DIALECTIC
In 1972, the annual Thomas Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities 
was inaugurated in Washington, D. C.,and Lionel Trilling was accorded 
the honor of delivering the first lecture. The dominant concern of 
this lecture is what Trilling describes as "a falling off in mind's 
vital confidence in itself"^ which is now occurring "within the intel- 
lectual life of the nation, and not of our nation alone." And through­
out the lecture, as Trilling surveys "the fortunes of mind"^ not only 
in the present but also in certain moments in the history of the West, 
he is constantly reminding his audience that much of the difficulty of 
the intellectual life is the consequence of either too much trust in the 
intellect or too much trust in the emotions. In eighteenth century 
rationalism, Trilling finds a fruitless and static faith in mind, and, 
in the protean irrationalism which is becoming the hallmark of con­
temporary culture, he uncovers too little faith in mind and too much 
trust in emotion. Ostensibly, what Trilling would argue for is the 
kind of integrity of personality which is found in the "whole man," 
who is dominated neither by intellect nor by feeling. And against 
these who new no longer accept intellect as an efficacious means of
75
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perceiving and understanding the world, Trilling stands steadfast, 
insisting, as he has always insisted, that the intellectual process 
can never be complete unless it establishes itself as a dialectic 
between thought and feeling, abstraction and intuition.
The lecture is beautifully written in the most aristocratic 
kind of prose, and every sentence bears the impress of Trilling's 
mind, which is of the highest intellectual order. In regard to the 
structure of the essay, one is reminded of a Ciceronian oration, for 
each of the four sections corresponds to the various parts denominated 
by Cicero as constituting an oration. Hence, each section corres­
ponds in sequence of parts to the exordium, the narratio, the con- 
firmatio, and the peroratio of the Ciceronian oration.
The exordium, which has as its function the introduction of a 
"subject," begins with a discussion of H. G. Wells and his posthumously 
published work, Mind at the End of Its Tether, which he wrote in 
1946, the last year of his life. In that curious little work, Wells 
renounces the notion of mind to which he had given an absolute assent 
during the major part of his life. In all of his writings, exclusive 
of this essay, there is to be found an unconditioned belief in the 
efficacy of intellect as the means of delivering man from his harmful 
illusions and prejudices and as the means of bringing about felicity 
into his world. But after World War II, Wells reversed this position 
because the horrible experiences of the w'ar bore unyielding evidence 
that man persists in his own illusions and prejudices, despite the 
intellectual emancipations which he had inherited from such thinkers 
as Darwin, Freud, Marx, and Einstein. Moreover, science, as one of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
the most intense manifestations of intellect, had provided the 
weapons which nourished the brutality and violence of war.
Trilling goes on to observe that this little book of Wells's, 
filled with so many harsh strictures about science and mind, gained 
little attention when it was posthumously published in 1946. In that 
year, there had no doubt been a chastening of the optimism of men 
toward science and mind, but the expectation still persisted that 
"mind would play a beneficent part in human experience."^ According to 
Trilling, the stringent criticisms of mind which Wells made were dis­
missed as the melancholy testament of an old and sick man, and nothing
more than that, so that the "little book made no place for itself in
the intellectual life of the quarter century after it appeared.""*
Today the situation is different. What was once the unheard 
jeremiad of Wells is now being transformed into a commonplace attitude 
in contemporary culture, and tragic disillusionment with mind, which 
seemed once the singular experience of Wells, is on its way to becoming 
the tragic experience of modern man:
Yet now, in this year of 1972, as I say the title of 
Wells's book, Mind at the End of Its Tether, there will,
I think, be some among us, and perhaps many, who will
hear it with the sense that it has a chill appositeness
to our present time. Of those who entertain an appre­
hension about the future of mind, there may be those 
who do so on Wells's absolute ground, that the tasks 
which are now imposed upon mind are beyond its inherent 
capabilities. Some will locate the cause of their 
anxiety in the paradoxes about the nature of mind which 
seem to be proposed by mind itself through the realization 
of its powers. Others are made uneasy by what they discern 
of a complex tendency of our culture to impugn and devalue the 
very concept of mind. Whichever way the foreboding points,
I venture to believe that there will be no difficulty 
in understanding how it might happen that, as I first
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contemplated speaking under the bright aegis of the 
name and spirit of Thomas Jefferson, there should have 
arisen out of the depths of memory the dark portent of 
Wells's phrase.®
The allusion which Trilling makes to Jefferson is not without 
anticipation, since, as Trilling is speaking under the bright aegis 
of Thomas Jefferson, a gesture of homage is most certainly appropriate.
Yet in Trilling's choice of the word "aegi§" something far more 
significant than mere homage is suggested. An "aegis" has certain 
mythological associations, which, say, one recalls of the "aegis" of 
Britomart or Gawain. And as critics have pointed out, such shields 
take one beyond mere heraldry, for the artists have often endued the 
"aegis" with the chief spiritual ideas of their culture.^ Hence,
Trilling, in alluding to the "bright aegis of the name and spirit of 
Thomas Jefferson," is emphasizing the cultural power and significance 
of Jefferson's life and ideas as they have become the received tra­
dition of American culture and, most significantly, as they can be 
shown to have a relevance to the situation of mind in the modern world.
Jefferson is introduced into the lecture as a man whose personal 
temperament, class tradition, and political views are so distinct from 
those of Wells that one can hardly see the two men as sharing anything 
apart from generic humanity. Yet despite their great differences in 
historical, social, and cultural circumstance, Wells and Jefferson "were 
at one in the firm confidence they placed in mind.... Historically speak-
o
ing, they stood in the same line."0
Trilling pays much attention to the tradition which inspired 
Thomas Jefferson, and he emphasizes that Jefferson, like Wells, 
derived the substance of his attitude toward mind from the Renaissance,
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"that what mind might encompass of knowledge of the physical universe 
has a direct bearing upon the quality of human existence, and also in 
its certitude that mind can, and should, be decisive in political
Q
life." Such is the Renaissance conception of mind, with its emphasis 
upon the practical power of the mind, and it is this concept of mind 
which became the foundation of the intellectual life of the eighteenth 
century.
And Thomas Jefferson, who "assented to this master belief of his 
time"^ with much enthusiasm and made this notion of mind the standard 
of the very conduct of his life, brought this tradition into American 
culture with such force that it can be spoken of as being represented 
by the "bright aegis of Thomas Jefferson." And yet, of the relation 
between the accomplishments of Jefferson’s life and the philosophy 
which inspired it, Trilling makes a rather curious observation:
When we consider the enthusiasm with which Jefferson 
assented to this master belief of his time and the 
assiduity with which he implemented it in the conduct 
of his own life, it is possible to make too much of his 
own mental endowment and by doing so to obscure one of 
the most important significances he has for us.H
The suggestion is bewildering and jarring, and one responds to it
by wondering how is it possible not to make too much of the author
of the Declaration of Independence, the founder of the University
of Virginia, and the architect of Monticello.
These accomplishments of Jefferson are part of the knowledge 
of most schoolboys, and they loom in the minds of many Americans as 
evidence that Jefferson possessed titanic qualities of mind. Yet 
Trilling warns that one should not make too much of them. Trilling 
argues that if one wishes to call Jefferson a genius, he should qualify 
the word:
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Thus, if we apply to him the word genius, we ought to 
use it, as he did, in the quiet, unassertive sense 
that prevailed in the eighteenth century, to mean 
distinguished ability, rather than in the sense it 
later came to have, that of a unique power, an origi­
nating power, which puts the person who possesses it 
into a class a p a r t . ^
And Jefferson, Trilling points out, did not possess a "unique origi­
nating power." Though he was fascinated with philosophy and though 
many learned books have been written on the philosophy of Jefferson, 
he was not "in the modem sense of the word, a genius of speculative 
t h o u g h t . H e  did not give "new answers to old q u e s t i o n s , a s  
say, Kant did, or "propose questions never asked b e f o r e , a s  did 
Schopenhauer. Jefferson's acumen in philosophy is limited to the 
mimetic and the pragmatic: "He possessed himself of the ideas of the 
philosophical originators of his own time and of the past; he chose 
among these ideas and made use of them
Trilling emphasizes the mimetic and pragmatic character 
of Jefferson's accomplishments not because he wishes to diminish their 
importance by seeing them as the achievements of a man of "distinguished 
ability" rather than "originating genius," but rather because he wishes 
his readers to understand that Jefferson shaped and determined his work 
and his life around the eighteenth century philosophy of mind in which 
reason is interpreted as a human faculty making for a natural equality 
among men.^ Jefferson cultivated his talents, not to become one in 
the company of aristocratic genius, but rather to make use of his mind 
and his ideas in a manner which could be emulated by any man who 
wishes to cultivate his mind.
The seriousness of Jefferson in his desire that the conduct of 
his intellectual life could be imitated by every citizen of the
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Republic can be seen in his Notes on the State of Virginia, in which
he sets forth his ideas on popular education. Here, Trilling tells
his readers that by examining "one detail" of this plan, one gains a
clear perspective of what Jefferson "expected-raf the American people
18by way of intellect." That "one detail" has to do with Jefferson's
recommendation that children, in the earliest of three stages of school-
19
ing, should be required to memorize "the substantive matter" of Greek, 
Roman, and American history.
This recommendation today might seem to many as a mere mechanical 
exercise of memory which is superficial in its effect upon the intellectual 
life, but Jefferson saw the study of history as something rich and profound 
and nourishing in the development of the public mind; and early familiar­
ity with history would generate a democracy constituted of a knowing 
and judging citizenry. It is a democracy of reasoning minds, not an 
aristocracy of genius, which Jefferson is most interested in, and 
Jefferson urges that children study history early in their education in 
order to initiate an intellectual process which creates a specific 
bond between men and the society in which they live. This point 
Trilling is scrupulously intent upon emphasizing, and he quotes 
Jefferson's description of what good results can be expected as 
following from the study of history:
Consider what he understands to follow in the way 
of intellectual process: "History by apprising them 
of the past will enable them to judge the future; it 
will avail them of the experiences of other times and 
nations; it will qualify them as judges of the actions 
and designs of men . . . ."20
The knowledge of the past, of the follies and the wisdoms of other
governments and other people, will make each citizen a wise judge of 
his own government.
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The recommendation that children be taught history early in their
education speaks for the whole vision of democracy which Jefferson
believed could be achieved through the judicious use of mind. As
Trilling explains:
Jefferson hoped that most of the children who were to 
receive the instruction he envisaged would become 
farmers or be engaged in occupations connected with 
agriculture, and its seemed to him natural and right 
that men in this walk of life should have had their 
memories stored with "the useful facts of the past" 
against the day when, as citizens responsible for 
their own happiness, they would bring them to bear 
upon the events of their own time and place.
This is the pastoral democracy which Jefferson conceives of, except
that its inhabitants are no naive Adams and Eves, but citizens who
must study and struggle with the present by deliberately bringing
the memory of the past upon it in order to shape their own destiny
and happiness. Through the use of their minds, the citizens of the
Republic were to create a dialectic which would make for social
equality: "The facts of the past," Trilling writes, "were useful
because they gave rise to ideas, and in ideas Jefferson perceived a
power which would countervail the power of property and thus make for
social equality in the Republic.
These recommendations which Jefferson makes in Notes on the 
State of Virginia can be taken as representative of the whole of his 
legacy to the American people. That legacy was received by educators 
with a great deal of seriousness, and the study of history, until 
recently, has been given considerable emphasis in the curriculum of 
elementary education. Today, the study of history is no longer accorded 
the significance and value which it was formerly given in the curriculum, 
and to the extent that educators show a conspicuous lack of interest
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in history, one can conclude that Jefferson's vision of mind has 
fallen into disfavor. This devaluation of history, then, Trilling
23understands to be the consequence of "contemporary pedagogic theory," 
and Trilling observes this of educators who reject not only Jefferson's 
valuation of history but also the model of mind implicit in that 
valuation:
Scarcely anybody nowadays will judge Jefferson's plan 
to be beyond debate. Our contemporary pedagogic theory 
will be distressed by the idea of storing what it would 
call the mere memories of children with what it would 
call mere facts and, at that, facts about the conduct of 
the alien race of adults in far distant times and places, 
having nothing to do with the desires and instincts of 
children.^4
The development and the education of the child, as it is suggested 
here, foreshadows the protean view of mind which is becoming ascendant 
in modern culture. In a society in which emotions and feeling are 
given precedence over abstractions and thought, the study of history 
is given little value. This is because of the character of history. 
History, quite naturally, makes men aware of the limits of human 
experience, and to the extent that it engenders a practical as well 
as an abstract sense of morality and establishes the necessity of 
such virtues as discipline, deliberation, and self-restraint, it is 
understood as a discipline which heightens human consciousness and 
which calls for, if not the sacrifice of human pleasure, then the 
subordination of instincts to transcendent human purpose.
Another ground upon which the study of history is now devalued 
is a philosophical one. Modern philosophical thought has accentuated 
the subjective aspects of human knowledge, and it tends to censor 
traditional bodies of knowledge, such as the humanities, because they 
are disciplines too close, too intimately connected with the self in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
in its subjective, partial, and individual manifestations. This
philosophical milieu has caused some historian to look askance upon
history because of its dependence upon memory and the narrative point
of view, both of which contain elements associated with subjectivity:
And searching questions are sure to be raised about 
the present state of the subject which Jefferson makes 
pre-eminent in elementary education. It will be asked, 
for instance, whether his view of history was not, as
compared with ours, a naive one. He did, of course,
understand that history might be biased, that party- 
lnterest might obscure or distort the facts. But he 
did not doubt that the facts were to be known and that 
the narrative of them, which they themselves would dic­
tate to any honest mind, would be the truth and, as such, 
unitary and canonical. This belief the historiography 
of our day teaches us to regard with skepticism. 25
That the study of history should be understood as something 
distant from the actualities of life, such as instincts and feelings, 
or that history itself should be faulted as a subject so circumscribed
by its own subjectivity as to be devoid of practical influence in the
affairs of men are notions which Trilling does not regard as valid. In 
fact, Trilling admires Jefferson’s conception of history as one of 
the great disciplines of mind. Out of a tradition which values "the 
sense of the past," Trilling finds the explanation of the great minds 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is an illustrious 
catalogue of genius that Trilling makes, and he sees each genius 
creating and shaping his destiny as he conceives it through the intense 
imagination of the past:
It can be said of Jefferson that his sense of the 
past was definitive of his intellectual life. From 
earliest youth into his old age the intense imagi­
nation of the past gave impetus to his mind— as, of 
course, it gave impetus to all the shaping minds of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Voltaire,
Diderot, Rousseau, Goethe, Hegel, Darwin, Marx,
Freud— all were rooted in their sense of the past,
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from which derived the force with which they addressed 
themselves to the present.26
It is this "sense of the past" which Trilling suggests shaped 
the direction and development of genius in the eighteenth and nine­
teenth centuries. Indeed the powerful humanitarian spirit, which is 
one of the distinguishing qualities of these geniuses of the eight- 
neenth centuries, can be thought of as flowing from a profound under­
standing of history. And since their work mirrors a realistic 
understanding of human instincts and its vicissitudes, along with a 
vision of political reality, valuable for its democratic character, 
Trilling renders it inconceivable that the shaping influence of history 
upon such genius, then and by implication now, should be censored for 
distorting truth or for being insensitive to human needs. Such genius 
Trilling interprets as being of the highest order, each genius in his 
own way representing the thought, struggle, and creation inspired by a 
dialectical sense of the past, and each thinker unyieldingly committed 
to the noble motive of bringing some happiness into a world of woe 
through the shaping power of mind.
Hence, Trilling thinks it a good thing that history should be
studied, and he sees a genetic relationship between history and the
progress of mind:
The efflorescence of mind in the two centuries before 
our own seems so closely bound up with the vivid 
imagination of the past that we are led to conclude 
that the urgent recollection of what man has already 
done and undergone in pursuit of his destiny is a 
necessary condition of comprehending and intending 
mind.^
While Trilling doubtless would not argue that the study of history 
can engender the kind of citizenry which Jefferson thought would bring
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equality to the Republic, Trilling obviously recognizes that the 
accomplished knowledge of history encourages a dialectic of mind 
which makes for complete human experience. To what extent or through 
what dynamic the "intense imagination of the past" stirred the pro- 
foundest kind of speculation in Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, Hegel,
Marx, Darwin, and Freud, Trilling does not say, but it is a certainty 
that he finds advantage in studying man from a historical perspective.
As one looks back on what Trilling includes in his exordium, he 
might justifiably have the experience of confusion. Many subjects and 
themes are contained therein: the formal renunciation of mind which 
Wells made in Mind at the End of Its Tether, a comparison of the person 
of Wells with that of Jefferson, the various traditions of minds coming 
from classical and modem times, Jefferson’s valuation of history and 
his subsequent identification of general intelligence with the study of 
history, and the decline of that Jeffersonian conception of history in 
modem pedagogy. Yet Trilling implicates these subjects and themes with 
a single motif, "the loss of confidence in mind" in contemporary culture. 
And, if the exordium is to be appreciated in its unity, these subjects 
and themes must be taken as variations related to this single motif of 
contemporary disenchantment with mind. Aristotle has pointed out that
O O
in every exordium there is an element of poetry. And the poetry of this 
exordium is no doubt experienced in the fugal unity of its rhetoric, 
which has the magic and beauty of music.
And of course, when one mentions a fugue, one must also understand 
the inevitability of dialectic, experienced here in the juxtaposition of 
one variation against the other. If the metaphor of the fugue makes one
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
87
appreciative of the unity of Trilling's lecture, the conception of dialectic 
is invaluable as a touchstone which enables the reader to follow and under­
stand Trilling’s labyrinthine arguments, in their completeness and their 
brilliance, even though Trilling, in unique contradistinction to his usual 
mode of exposition, does not mention the term "dialectic" once in the entire 
lecture.
The narratio, the second part of the Ciceronian oration, has 
as its function the formal presentation of the case, and this aim calls for 
a circumspect attitude upon the speaker who draws together facts, observations, 
and authoritative sources of knowledge to support a charge or a claim. In 
other words, what is casually suggested as "the subject" of the exordium 
becomes, by way of formal presentation and achieved focus, the case of the 
narratio. It is not without anticipation, once the reader is convinced that 
Trilling is following the order of the Ciceronian oration, that the formality 
and circumspection of the second part of Mind in the Modern World is the 
consequence of Trilling's intention to demonstrate that in recent times the 
conception of mind to which H. G. Wells and Thomas Jefferson gave their 
allegiance and shaped their lives, is now being rejected by men of great 
esteem and authority as a tradition and a style of life no longer appropriate 
or valuable to human purposes.
Until the eighteenth century the relationship of mind to society 
is quite unambiguous and is not, as Trilling puts it, an "issue." The 
questions of what mind is, and what constitutes its nature, and how far its 
influence extends in the shaping of human destiny come later in that period 
of history of Europe between the Puritan Revolution and the yet more drastic 
Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. Until this time, mind, no
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matter how admirable and promising or brilliant a development it 
achieves within a culture, is still subordinate to the purposes of 
the church and state. But in the span between the Puritan and French 
Revolutions the ascendancy of mind in human affairs is such that the 
intellectual life of these times can be equated with the actual char­
acter of the culture. It is important to understand here that the 
democracy emerging out of these revolutions does more than diminish 
the power of the king and the church. In the place of the authority 
of king and clergy, democracy substitutes mind which henceforth men 
will look toward in confidence and in trust.
The Puritans, inheriting from the Renaissance a zeal for inquiry
and debate and interest in Hebrew texts, formulated their notion of
government from the kinds of intellectual efforts that the Renaissance
disciplines inspired. They did not rely upon kingly authority, nor
church tradition in the formulation of the commonwealth. Although
their conclusions about theology and government could be rigid and
absolutistic as any monarch or church, the Puritans arrived at their
dogmas only after they had thought and argued profoundly about their
relations to "the Word." The inherent dynamics between mind and
democracy are best elucidated by Professor Michael Walzer. In his
book The Revolution of Saints, Trilling finds an insightful account of
the relationship between mind and democracy as it was initiated by the
Puritan clergymen of seventeenth century England. In a sense they
foreshadow the intelligentsia who would wield such powerful influence
in future democracies because they were "the first of a class of men
who bring ideas, publicly expressed, to bear upon the nature of the
polity, making it a question for debate how society should be con- 
29structed." It is this new liaison between mind and government in
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which the conduct of the mind is to become the new criterion of the 
political state. As Trilling expresses it later in his lecture: "Plato, 
when he undertook to say what the right conduct of mind should be, found 
the paradigm in the just society. We reverse that procedure, finding
on
the paradigm of a just society in the right conduct of mind."
The actual secularization of reason— meaning here the recognition 
of mind as an autonomous spiritual faculty— is achieved during the 
French Revolution. In the period of the French Revolution, reason is 
equated with the universal concept of spiritual reality, and it is no 
longer thought of as being in the service of a particular religious or 
political persuasion.
The architectonic of reason for Trilling is a conjoining of reason 
and emotions in dialectic; it is this kind of union which characterizes 
the complete intellectual experience. Trilling*s conception of reason 
has the same quality about it as Milton’s conception of the moral life. 
It must not be "fugitive and cloistered" or "unexercised and unbreathed" 
but must partake of the race and struggle.^ As he describes therefore 
the further development of mind during the French Revolution, it becomes 
evident that he has his reservations about an unconditioned faith in 
intellect, at least the kind of optimistic and unmodulated faith which 
French revolutionaries had in mind. This impression Trilling makes upon 
his readers as he concludes his survey with this statement about the 
eighteenth century notion of mind: "An early consequence of this new 
expectation of mind was that it gave rise to a certain coarseness of 
intellectual procedure— to what we call, with some adverse force, 
rationalism.
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What Trilling holds in disdain of eighteenth century rationalism
is the exclusive value which it places upon intellect and its rather
superficial dismissal of the imagination as something secondary.
The rationalists, holding to the Cartesian notion of the world as
res extensa, thought that the intellect should formulate and develop
itself with the actuality and regularity which it saw in the world.
Rationalism denies the dialectical character of human perception; it
understands the mind to be capable of abstract laws and principles,
and it attributes to these cognitions and unconditional validity.
As against this eighteenth century mechanistic notion of mind,
in which there can be no dialectic of ideas and feelings, Trilling
turns his discussion to the romantic vision of mind. This vision of
mind he describes with sympathy and approbation partially because of
its effort to "correct the theory of mind which had become dominant in
33
the eighteenth century." The romantics believed in the kind of 
growth and development that comes through the dialectical perceptions 
of the self. As Trilling expresses it: "To the principle of the 
machine the antagonists of rationalism opposed the principle of the 
organism, the view that man and his institutions are not designed 
and contrived but have their autonomous existence through the in-
*3 /
herent laws of their growth and development."
Romanticism, then, is not only to be understood as a tradition 
which is defined by its opposition to mechanistic rationalism. Its 
purposes are also reconciliatory; it wishes to include the human imagi­
nation and the cognitive powers of mind within a single experience. 
Indeed,for Trilling, the deepest and most salutary aspect of romanticism 
resides in the intention of the artist to make cognitions and feeling
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one. Imagination and intellect are "integral to any right conception
of mind.”35
How insistent the romantic poets were upon the matter can be 
found in Wordsworth’s "great autobiographical poem," of which Trilling 
observes:
. . . The Prelude gives the classic account of the 
damage done to the mind of the individual, to its 
powers of cognition no less than its vital force, by 
the scientistic conception of mind that prevailed among 
the intellectuals at the time of the French Revolution.
The explanatory subtitle of the poem is "The Growth of 
the Poet's Mind"— for Wordsworth, the poet's mind was 
the normative mind of man. It grew, he said, not 
through the strengthening of its powers of analysis 
and abstraction but through the development of feeling, 
imagination, and will.36
Wordsworth's way of conceiving mind, for Trilling, reaches far beyond 
the mere interests of poetry and can be taken as illustrative of the 
"normative mind." When Wordsworth portrays the mind as growth, as 
a dialectically achieved balance between reason and feeling, he is 
giving his reader a model of mind quite different from the vision of 
mind upheld by the eighteenth century philosophers. And Trilling, quite 
sympathetic to Wordsworth's conception of mind as dialectical unity, 
reveals in part his own intellectual posture. Of Wordsworth's resis­
tance to the constricting views of eighteenth century mechanistic 
thought and of his vision of mind as a dynamic between self and the 
world, between intuition and reason, Trilling writes approvingly.
Romanticism is depicted by Trilling as a "corrective" to a 
vision of mind succinctly described by Pascal as '"the spirit of
0 7
geometry.'" In alluding to Pascal, Trilling is emphasizing the 
philosophical significance inherent in Romanticism in general, and
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he also is underscoring what profound business Wordsworth was about 
in his poetry and in his criticism. In holding to "the spirit of 
geometry," the eighteenth-century philosophers overlooked another 
aspect of mind which Pascal calls "the acute or subtle spirit,"^® an 
aspect of mind complementary to the "spirit of geometry," or the rational 
aspect of mind. The "acute or subtle spirit" represents the elements 
of will, feeling, and imagination, all of which constituted, for the 
romantics, a central part of the human psyche. As Wordsworth wished 
to comprehend both aspects of mind into a single experience, Trilling 
interprets the central concern of the poet's work with the restoration 
of mind and feeling. This division which Wordsworth sought to correct 
is often referred to as the Cartesian split, the unhappy division between 
mind and feeling, which was the consequence of the ascendancy of 
rationalism.
Interestingly, though often thought otherwise, this division is not 
a problem peculiar to modern times. The metaphysical enigma of objective 
and subjective knowledge, Ernest Cassirer writes in his Essay on Man, has 
been the preoccupation of philosophers, theologians, and poets through­
out the entire history of the West. Of these two views of knowledge, 
each containing two different epistemologies, he writes: "The struggle 
between these two conflicting views has lasted for many centuries, and 
at the beginning of the modern era— at the time of the Renaissance and 
in the seventeenth century— we still feel its full s t r e n g t h . I n  
referring to the distinction which Pascal makes between the spirit of 
geometry and "the acute or subtle spirit," Trilling seizes upon a phrase 
which recapitulates the history of this profound philosophical dichotomy,
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and he relates that dichotomy to Wordsworth's intentions as a poet 
and as a critic.
Hence, in Wordsworth's desire to integrate "feeling, imagination, 
and will" with the cognitive process of the human psyche, Trilling de­
picts Wordsworth as a poet who took upon himself a problem of great 
philosophical import, and one with which the philosophers, poets, and 
theologians who were his predecessors were much concerned. The Greeks 
sought to understand the disparity between the world of ideals and the 
world of the senses; Augustine spent his life studying the relationship 
between reason and faith; and Wordsworth addressed himself to the rela­
tionship between intellect and feelings. The terms of each of these 
conflicts, of course, were different, yet at the heart of the matter 
lay an intense desire on the part of all these men to find unity between 
two orders of knowledge.
A careful reading of Wordsworth's work indicates that the science 
of his time, as a particular species of objective thinking and a power­
ful form of eighteenth century rationalism, constitutes only part of the 
threat to the unity of the human spirit. This is not to diminish the 
validity of Wordsworth's concern about the ascendancy of science. Indeed, 
the apprehension about science which Wordsworth showed survives to this 
day, and it can account for much of the alienation which modern man suffers 
from himself, from others, and from the world.
Yet never did Wordsworth wish to destroy or devalue the accomplish­
ments of science. Indeed, as a student of mathematics, he found much 
to admire in science and he was convinced that science, taken here to 
represent the cognitive processes of mind, should be encompassed in
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common experience. Hence, in writing that "Wordsworth's attitude toward 
science has a peculiar pertinence to . . . the situation of mind in our 
culture,"^0 Trilling is stressing Wordsworth's wish to reconcile science 
with the imagination, feelings, and will over and against what he is 
usually remembered for, and that is his opposition to mechanistic ration­
alism.
One of the best remembered things about Wordsworth is 
the antagonism to science he expressed, but it is 
scarcely less characteristic of his thought that he 
did not consent to see the poetic mind and the scientific 
mind as being in final opposition to each other. On 
the contrary, he asserted that there was a natural 
affinity between them. "Poetry," he said, ". . .is the 
impassioned expression which is on the countenance of 
all science," and he predicted that the day would come 
when the discoveries of scientists would be "as proper 
objects of the Poet's art as any which can be employed."
There was, however, one condition which he said must pre­
vail before this happy state of affairs could come about—  
that the substance of science should become familiar to those 
who are not scientists.^1
It is unity of perception which Wordsworth seeks, and that unity of
knowledge can be brought about by the poet, who as the "normative man"
can perceive a "natural affinity," a dialectic, between science and
passion.
That condition has never come about; indeed, science, growing 
at an accelerating rate into ever more complex bodies of specialized 
knowledge, has become even more separated from the understanding of the 
layman. Hence the vision of mind, which emerges in the late eighteenth 
century and which created such anxiety among the romantic poets, still 
engenders disunity in the intellectual life, despite Wordsworth's bril­
liant efforts to reconstruct a more comprehensive vision of human knowledge. 
The "operative conceptions" of human knowledge remain unintelligible to 
most people, and the discoveries of science engage no emotion nor stir
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the imaginations of the poets. Yet Trilling is not so much saddened 
by the widening gap between science and the layman as he is disturbed 
by the loss of the desire for unity between science and emotion. More­
over, the modem poets do not suffer in the least from the anxiety 
which Wordsworth experienced over the schisms between the imagination 
and the discoveries of science. With telling brevity, Trilling observes
/  O
of this situation: "Our poets are indifferent to them."
The consequence of the loss of the Jeffersonian ideal, a notion 
of dialectical intelligence achieved through the study of science and 
the humanities, has been sad for both the layman and the scientists.
The majority of educated men, unable to understand modem science, 
find "their intellectual self-esteem" wounded by their own ignorance 
to such a degree that they "all agree to be silent"^ about it. Such 
silent humiliation, of course, is accompanied by a tragic and despair­
ing sense of the inefficacy of mind in dealing with the daily experience 
of life.
If the dialectic, which comes from a general knowledge and intel­
ligence, is denied the educated citizenry as a consequence of their 
being disjoined from a knowledge of science, the scientists, circum­
scribed in the abstruse matter of their own discipline, suffer a similar 
kind of fate. According to Trilling, they lack a sense of the conditioned, 
the attentiveness to the particulars and circumstances of existence, 
something which Milton speaks of in Paradise Lost as "prime Wisdom."
Of the plight of the scientists, Trilling writes:
But surely, it might be said, when it comes to the 
actual living of life this exclusion from science is 
not of decisive consequence. When Adam in Paradise Lost 
says that he wants to understand the mysteries of the 
cosmos, the archangel Raphael tells him not to puzzle 
his head over these abstruse matters and assures him
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that the "prime Wisdom" is to know "that which before 
us lies in daily life." The good sense of the angelic
advice is confirmed when we consider that our scientific
friends and colleagues do not seem any further advanced 
in the prime Wisdom than any of the rest of us. They 
see no more clearly than we do what lies before us in 
daily life.44
A profound observation, indeed, Trilling makes here, for no 
matter how much the scientists may know about the complex operations 
of the universe, when it comes to the actual living of life as con­
ditioned creatures, they have demonstrated no moral acumen or taught
the laity any ethical truth commensurate with the dignity and power 
which society accords them for their achievement within their discipline. 
They wander in mazes, closed to most men, wonderful mazes in which they 
make brilliant discoveries, and they are admired for what they find 
there. But should they be called upon to give a unified account of 
things, they offer no penetrating insights or great philosophical illu­
minations. They are as impoverished in the general intelligence of
things as are all men.
But these failings would be of little consolation to those who
are not scientists, or those who are in "the contemporary disciplines 
which address themselves to the affairs of daily life." In the case 
of the latter, these disciplines too have circumscribed their own fields 
and separated themselves from the general intelligence of dialectic 
and energy which sustains an enlightened society. In illustration of 
this point, Trilling singles out the development of economics in the 
past century and a half. When John Stuart Mill published his Principles 
of Political Economy in 1848, the book was "at once a great popular 
success," going through thirty-two editions subsequent to its original 
publications. The controversy it created in the literary world cannot
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but win admiration. Dickens, for instance, so hated the work that 
he wrote Hard Times, a novel which seeks to demonstrate "how deplorable 
were the human implications of Mill’s view." And then there was Ruskin, 
who was so upset by the book, that he wrote his monumental essays on 
the relation between art and economics. His essays evoked more contro­
versy, for when Ruskin published his essays in Thackeray's Cornhill 
Magazine, the subscribers became so outraged at Ruskin that they threat­
ened to cancel their subscriptions. Such, says Trilling, was the effect 
of Mill's treatise: "That is to say, Mill's treatise entered into the
general culture of its time; it was an object of the general intellect
of the nation." Today there is no such book written about economics
which can bring up the dialectical energy of thought and culture achieve­
ment as Mill's Principles of Political Economy. Contemporary economics 
has become specialized to the point that it places the subject matter 
"at a hopeless distance from the l a y m a n ."45
Other social disciplines have followed the same pattern. History 
has been described already by Trilling as falling into a "deteriorating 
status." Philosophy, traditionally addressed to the purpose of making 
men think clearly, "has become a technical subject for specialists and 
no longer consents to accommodate the interest and effort of any 
reasonably strong intelligence." In the case of literature, Trilling 
continues, there was a development which was quite different from the 
situation in economics, history, or philosophy. Some decades ago, certain 
scholars of literature decided "that literary works are not so readily 
accessible to the understanding as at first they might look to be." With 
this assumption in mind, they proceeded to devise "elaborate and sophis­
ticated methods" for a comprehension of literary works. But these
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methods brought effects which were quite opposite to the intentions 
of well-meaning teachers of literature. Though they hoped that their 
methods would deepen the study of literature and elucidate its meaning 
for the ordinary readers, they actually transformed their discipline into 
"an esoteric subject available only to expert knowledge." The failings 
of these scholars brought complaints from literary critics who noted 
that "the hyperactivity of criticism and scholarship had come to stand 
as a barrier between the ordinary reader and the literary work." This 
criticism was constructive and salutary, Trilling observes, because it 
aimed at the faults and "did not question the usefulness of literary 
study," nor "the faith in the inherent instructive power which had long 
characterized American higher education." And, for a moment, it seemed 
that a dialectical exchange of thought had emancipated literature from 
the confusion and inaccessibility which had characterized other dis­
ciplines.^
But when Professor Louis Kampf as president of the Modern Language 
Association gave his presidential address in 1971, something of a wound 
to the self-esteem of teachers of literature can be said to have taken 
place. In that speech Kampf "assured" his audience "that the teaching 
of literature in American colleges is now virtually at its end, having 
lost all rational justification /emphasis mine/." Kampf argues that the 
teaching of literature in America, as it is inspired by Matthew Arnold, 
is'"a diversion and a spectacle?*^ originating in the impractical world 
of aesthetics. As Trilling sees it, Kampf dismisses literature as archaic 
and useless because "it has no possible bearing upon the matters which
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must be the chief or only objects of concern, the anomalies and
injustices of American llfe."^®
Now, the "wound" which Kampf gives might have been suffered in
"silent humiliation" by his colleagues, but Trilling's response to
Kampf, filled as it is with irony and innuendo, contains a number of
dialectical suggestions, which in no way suggests silence and humiliation.
No sooner does Trilling refer to Kampf*s allusion to Matthew Arnold's
conception of literature than one anticipates a crushing answer from
the critic who has explicated so beautifully and profoundly Arnold's
notion of literature as a "criticism of life."^ But Trilling is far too
patrician, far too magnanimous a man, to strike back with ungenerous
criticism. Indeed, all Trilling says in this connection is that Kampf
paid no attention to
that influence in the part of Arnold's theory of 
literature where it truly resides, in the continuing 
force of the famous characterization of literature as 
"a criticism of life" and in Arnold's definition of 
criticism as the effort "to see the object as in it­
self it really is," the objects upon which it directs it­
self being not literature alone but also ideas in 
general and most especially ideas about society.
In other words, Trilling suggests that Kampf has not apprehended what
Arnold has insisted literature must always be: energetic, dialectical,
paradoxical. It must be possessed of these attributes because they
are the very stuff of human experience, at least in its finest and
highly developed moments. If the artist is to capture this sense of
experience in completeness, he must remove himself from needs and interests,
whether they come from his own psyche or the particular group to which
he allies himself. What Kampf interprets as "aesthetic" and "ultimate
remove" in literature is what Arnold calls "disinterestedness."^^
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In Kampf’s allusion to Matthew Arnold, Trilling shows that 
Kampf has, to say the least, been rather careless in understanding the 
complexity and variability of what Arnold defines . as literature.
Trilling does not dwell upon the insufficiencies of Kampf’s under­
standing of Arnold. Instead he confronts Kampf1s other charge that 
literature is divorced from social reality and politics by examining 
it in the light of what Kampf seems to value most: the immediacy of 
political experience. Trilling does this by formulating a rhetorical 
question which is intended to uncover a contradictory omission in Kampf's
charge. "Why," Trilling asks with dialectical aplomb, "if the dereliction
of literature from seriousness is this absolute, the totalitarian coun-
52
tries are so fearful of it Professor Kampf does not tell us."
After suggesting that there are certain unresolved aspects in
Kampf's charges, Trilling, at least for a moment, seems lighthearted
when he points to matters about which Kampf is not vague at all:
He is prepared, however, to name the exact moment when, 
after generations during which teachers were animated 
by their faith in the educative powers of literature, 
they came at last to understand that theirs was a commit­
ment to a corrupting frivolity— the year was 1968, the 
occasion was the campus uprisings, which, in Professor 
Kampf's view, at long last forced social and political 
reality upon the consciousness of students and teachers 
alike. Since 1968, Professor Kampf says, "the young go
into the profession with dread; the old can scarcely
wait for retirement; and those of the middle years 
yearn for sabbaticals. "53
If there is any spectacle and diversion to be associated with literature, 
it is surely here when, as the president of one of the most distinguished 
organizations of literary scholars, Kampf tells those who spend life­
times studying Shakespeare, Milton, Emerson, Twain, Dickinson that 
"theirs is a commitment to a corrupting frivolity."
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But no matter how sanguine a dismissal of literature and how
theatrical a rejection of his profession Kampf makes, Trilling is
quick to remind his audience that beneath all of Kampf's flamboyance,
there is an intense despair born of the fatal split in knowledge caused
by eighteenth century rationalism. He is quite back to his sober tone
when he ends the second part of Mind in the Modem World by underscoring
the symbolic implications of Kampf's speech:
He speaks as the elected chief officer of the pro­
fessional association of teachers of literature: 
in his estimate of the morale of his constituency 
there must be some quantum of truth. We can there­
fore say that in our time the mind of a significant 
part of a once proud profession has come to the end 
of its tether.^
In making this statement, Trilling wishes to connect that despair of 
mind which was so singular a thing in the case of Wells with certain 
developments in the academic world of contemporary culture. Knowledge, 
having been disjoined by the autonomy given to science in the eighteenth 
century, is disconnected and disunified. Each discipline seems to have 
been "wounded" by the ascendant superiority accorded to science. Many 
of the social disciplines and the humanities have suffered further intel- 
lecutal disgrace, because scholars have emulated the specialized tech­
niques of science. But what they actually have achieved is an ersatz 
dignity and often an arrogance not unlike that of mechanistic science.
In the third part of Mind in the Modern World, Trilling observes that 
his efforts in former sections have been devoted to circumstances which 
account for "an uneasiness" which "has come into our relation to mind."
But now he suggests a more penetrating account of disenchantment with 
mind can be gained by considering the phenomenon as "something other
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than a response to particular alienating circumstance," as perhaps
"the expression of an attitude toward mind which is more nearly autonomous,
and adverse judgment passed upon mind in its very essence.
Hence, it is apparent that Trilling is inviting his readers into a 
deeper and more complex consideration of the moral and psychological 
causality which underlies the growing disenchantment with mind in con­
temporary culture. These new lines of investigation to which Trilling 
now addresses himself change the perspective of his speech, and the 
reader henceforth considers the plight of mind in the modern world in 
a manner quite different from the historical or descriptive delineation 
of the problem. Indeed, as it turns out, Trilling now directs his attention 
to the moral, the psychological, and the metaphysical aspects of human 
experience.
The new emphasis which Trilling places upon "attitude” as a mani­
festation of autonomy, adversity, and judgement indicates the measure of 
moral assent which is contained in the loss of confidence in mind. This 
is not unanticipated, at least for those readers who have been following 
the lecture as a Ciceronian oration; traditionally the third part of the 
oration can be likened to a climax, for it is at this point that the 
speaker represents his own evaluations, judgements, and arguments as 
they pertain to the issues which have been raised in the exordium and 
the narratio of the speech. In short, the confirmatio contains the 
speaker's "case," as it is sometimes said.
The argument which Trilling presents is long and detailed, and 
it is very difficult to summarize. For one thing, the scepticism about 
mind, which he understands to be the expression of an attitude, quite
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naturally brings into his discussion matters of politics and meta­
physics. Although Trilling seeks out and explores disillusionment 
with mind in the light of moral causality, he does not abandon those 
long and telling summaries of historical events, those descriptions of 
contemporary situations, which, as has been seen, he handles with such 
adroitness for other purposes. But here, more than any other place 
in the lecture, Trilling goes beyond the surface of circumstances in 
quest of human attitudes, and he seeks to establish the degree to which 
such attitudes can be considered, if not the source of circumstances, then 
perhaps the explanation of their continued existence. Hence the comments, 
observations and paradoxes which he now makes of these historical events 
and contemporary circumstances can be taken as judgments. What Trilling 
wishes his reader to understand is that the adversary proceeding against 
mind is not so much determination of circumstance as it is the expression 
of a willed dissatisfaction with mind.
The "adversary proceeding" against mind, Trilling suggests, can be 
understood as an aspect of the political development in contemporary 
culture: "It is a commonplace of our day to speak of crises of authority, 
and the glibness with which we use the phrase does not derogate from the 
salient actuality of what it denotes. One such crisis of authority, 
we might suppose, is taking place in relation to m i n d . T h i s  adverse 
attitude toward mind is, then, actually an aspect of a new species of 
democracy. As part of a new political philosophy, intensely egalitarian 
in its vision of life, the adversary attitude rejects mind as a human 
power which works against the best interests of democracy.
Mind, from this point of view, is represented as "having two 
maleficient effects"^ upon society, and the specificity and formality
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of the charge indicates the degree of deliberation and thought con­
tained in this attitude toward mind. One such charge is that mind 
inevitably engenders authority which interferes with the growth of 
social equality. The other charge has to do with the effect of mind 
upon personality. Here the very discipline and cultivation of mind 
is understood to bring about a deformation of personality.
Trilling does not deny that mind engenders authority, nor does he 
underestimate the agitating powers of intellect. He would differ, of 
course, on the values and the interpretation which certain political 
philosophers find in these aspects of mind. One of the central points 
which Trilling establishes quite early in his confirmatio is that "a 
chief characteristic of mind is the claims which it makes, or which 
are made for it, to a very high authority indeed."'*® As Trilling sees 
it, mind, assisting in the emancipative processes of democracy, evolves 
and grows strong with the democratic government it creates, and the 
powers of mind, now freed to create a dialectic of any kind, become 
aggressive.
This evolving authority of mind, according to Trilling, begins 
in early history, particularly among the Greeks, and can be traced in 
the political development of the nineteenth century. Originally the 
powers of mind were equated with divinity itself. The Greeks, perceiv­
ing an analogy between mind and authority, associated mind with class 
position. Plato, for example, attributed to mind a superiority over 
all other activities, and so in the question of authority, he argues 
that it belongs to men of mind, or "the Philosopher-Kings." Aristotle, 
more sympathetic to democracy than Plato, saw mind as an activity
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appropriate to the aristocracy. According to him, "the right devel-
59
opment of individual mind" can occur "only in men of high rank."
In the nineteenth century, when democratic notions of govern­
ment were displacing the old monarchic states, mind is still associated 
with authority, in spite of the fact that intellect was one of the 
chief instrumentalities of democracy. However, the authority which 
is now associated with mind is not static authority, such as once 
possessed by king and bishop, but a more mobile authority, achieved 
through dint of aggressive thought and will. Henceforth, whosoever 
develops the powers of mind and makes strenuous and heroic efforts to 
understand himself and the world is accorded the kind of admiration, 
prestige, and command which makes for authority.
In the metaphysical matter of what constitutes the essence 
of mind, Trilling sees the adversary proceeding as being quite correct 
in its interpretation of the native powers of mind. Its egalitarian 
zeal then has not been an obstacle to a correct understanding of mind 
in its historical and metaphysical development. And to a limited 
degree, Trilling finds a certain cogency in its argument; as mind 
does engender authority and as it does make great demands of human 
time and human energy, it might well be thought of as an aberration, 
disruptive of Edenic quietude.
About the conscious attitudes and rationalized aspects of 
the adversary proceeding, Trilling reserves his judgment until a 
later stage in the confirmatio when he uncovers the insufficiency of 
the movement in its manifest attitude. At this point, he is more 
interested in the covert aspect of the movement, the aspect of the 
ideology which one might describe as almost unconscious. Of this
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approach much is to be said because it treats the adversary proceeding
as a psychological puenomenon. For if revolutions are sublimated
transformations of phantasy, as Fred Weinstein and Gerald Platt argue
in The Wish to be Free, then it behooves the thoughtful and responsible
critic to decide whether these subliminal wishes are creative or
60
destructive human attitudes.
In a very subtle way, Trilling makes use of this methodology when 
he speaks of that "certain voice" of the late nineteenth century which 
in its protest against mind anticipates the adversary proceeding.
That voice came from no revolutionary manifesto, but from an "enchant­
ing romance," written by William Morris and entitled News from Nowhere. 
In that romance Morris describes a society of perfect felicity, but 
he argues that before such felicity can be achieved, two ideals, quite 
similar to the aims of the adversary proceeding, must be realized:
Two ideals were to be realized in Morris's utopia: 
one was equality; the other was rest, the cessation of 
all anxious effort. To this end Morris excluded science, 
philosophy, and high art from his community. His happy 
people occupy themselves with what he had elsewhere 
called the "lesser arts," those modest enterprises of 
the hand which produce useful and decorative objects of 
daily life.
This vision of "unvexed life" in News from Nowhere charmed its readers 
for eighty years, but its attitude toward mind made it impossible for 
anyone to take the book seriously. Such is not the case today, because 
the attitude which Morris assumed toward mind has gained enough popular 
assent as to constitute a revolution: "We in our time will be less dis­
posed to condescend to the book which eight decades ago stated the case
62
against mind that is now being openly litigated in our culture."
The delightful fantasy of Morris has now been transformed into a power­
ful social movement.
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In his imagining of such utopian democracy, Morris reveals an
unambiguous wish for an Edenic world, where man may live a passive,
untroubled, unconditioned life. To this end he eschews the dialectical
energies of mind because he fears "the aggressivity of comprehension
and control which highly developed mind directs upon the world" and the
"competitiveness and self-aggrandizement" following people in their
pursuit of the life of reason. And similarly he fears the authority
of mind as it expresses itself in genius, because with genius comes
one of the most authoritative manifestations of mind:
He wanted no geniuses to distress their less notable 
fellows by their pre-eminent ability to tell the 
truth or be interesting, and to shine brighter than
the general run of mankind, requiring our submission
to the authority of their brilliance, distrubing us 
with novel ideas and difficult tastes, perhaps tempting 
some few to emulate them by giving up rest in order to ^
live laborious days and incur the pains of mental fight.
The voice of the intellect, then, for Morris is not gentle, and it
64
has no place in his paradise.
In describing the particular hostility which Morris holds against 
genius, Trilling speaks of the "laborious days" and "mental fight" 
which genius requires of itself and activates in other less gifted
men, and which is the source of disturbance to that treasured rest
of the new utopia.^ Much as the phrases may sound like Trilling, 
for they ring with the clarity and sonority of his style, they are not 
of his making. They are taken from Milton's'tycidas"^ and Blake's 
"Stanzas from Milton''^ ?; they are, in short, allusions, but Trilling
does not choose them for mere rhetorical effect. Their use is intended
to specify the kind of genius which Morris wishes to exile from his 
world, and the two poets to which Trilling alludes in illustration of 
this point are possessed of such significance that the mere mention
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of their names symbolizes . what Morris wishes to remove himself 
from.
Morris wishes to free himself of that received tradition of 
democracy, which Milton and Blake, the two great visionaries of liberty, 
represent in their writings and in their lives as the continuous and 
achieved dialectic of mind. In this there is irony, for while Blake 
and Milton may be singled out as men possessed of the most aggressive 
and authoritarian kind of genius, no two poets better understood how 
deeply entrenched is the desire of the heart for felicity, Milton con­
ceiving it as Paradise, Blake mythologizing it as Eden.
Yet Milton and Blake understood felicity as an achievement which 
comes only after the struggle and dialectic of mind. Moreover, for 
both poets the tangled experiences of this world of matter, of time 
and space, and of good and evil make impossible the achievement of a 
state of rest as Morris would have it in this world. The very anxiety 
and suffering of thought which Morris sees as doing violence to the 
self and to humanity is identified by Milton and by Blake as the highest 
kind of moral and creative freedom. Such suffering Milton interprets 
as an aspect of the "happy fall," and he would argue that it consti­
tutes a new dignity in man, achieved through his "fall" from the child­
like Adam of the early days of Paradise to the anguished Job who shapes 
his faith through profound questionings and sublime affirmations. 
Similarly, Blake conceives of Eden not as innocence alone, but as 
innocence conjoined to the experience of thought and pain, the con­
sequences of which come in a moment of Edenic ecstasy.
In contrast to this, what Morris wishes for is a world of un­
conditioned felicity in which nothing is required of men. Such a
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vision, once unmasked, can be seen as having its origins in an undying 
68narcissism; and narcissism is the universal temptation which every 
man is expected to renounce. But Morris, within the limits of his 
romance, finds no humiliation in yielding to that wish as he makes 
attractive a utopia of embryonic bliss, free of the differentiating 
power of mind and its anxious perception of the world as a dialectic 
between the unconditioned and the conditioned.
Trilling allows the weakness of this vision to speak for 
itself. It is a foolish and destructive wish for the kind of un­
conditioned absolutism which, in addition to denying the dialectical 
character of reality, diminishes the dignity of being human, of having 
personality, of making moral choices, of being isolate in thoughtful 
reflection, and of being possessed of distinction.
Trilling therefore considers William Morris's News from Nowhere 
to be a document of great cultural significance. Its publication fore­
shadows the transformation which democracy undergoes in contemporary 
culture. That transformation can be understood in the contrast of 
the democracy of the nineteenth century with the new ascending species 
of democracy now found in contemporary culture. Whereas in the nine­
teenth century democracy made considerable gain through a series of 
dialectics between mind and the old authoritarian traditions, the 
democracy of the twentieth century is inspired by a vision of felicity 
in which mind is devalued because of its disruptive and dialectical 
powers.
In suggesting a genetic relationship between the adversary proceed­
ing and the vision of the "unvexed life" in News from Nowhere, Trilling 
is not making a psychoanalytic exploration which reduces this social 
phenomenon to mere impulse. He is rather placing a fundamental
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question before his readers, one which has to do with primal human 
motives. As Trilling understands it, the issue is what men want, 
really want, apart from what they think they want, or what they claim 
to want.
Certainly the citizens of contemporary culture do not seem inter­
ested in the kind of freedom for which men like Voltaire, Jefferson,
Mill, and Freud fought so hard. Indeed, it can be argued that no sooner 
had men achieved the right to think out and shape their destinies than 
they regretted the victory which placed upon them the heavy burden and 
responsibility attendant upon the life of reason. They perhaps realized 
that thought does not come easily; it requires the effort, the time, 
and the sacrifice of "laborious nights." Moreover in a society of eman­
cipated minds, where ideas abound in dialectical strife, intellectual 
identity cannot be established through the leisurely conduct of mind. 
There must be aggression, or "mental fight to command the attention 
of others to one intellectual authority.
Trilling puts aside, at least for a while, this not very flatter­
ing aspect of human nature as it can be observed in the distortion of 
a humanitarian ideal, in the disguised use of an abstraction for a rather 
primitive human desire. Trilling here shifts his attention to the two 
charges which he formerly identified as constituting the adversary pro­
ceeding against mind. He examines the adversary proceeding in the aspect 
of its consciously defined aims, and whenever possible he acknowledges 
whatever cogency there exists in the argument of the movement, in spite 
of his implied misgivings about the validity of this new cultural 
phenomenon.
He approaches the first charge, that mind makes for inequality,
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as a philosophical construct, and, of course, this brings into 
discussion the question of the validity of the first charge, first 
as an abstraction and then as an idea developed in the dialectic of 
human experience and of history. He begins by discussing a basal 
notion which the first charge presupposes* if mind can be accused of 
making for inequality, then conversely one must be able to conceive 
of a state of existence in which there is equality, and in which mind 
plays a definitive part in actualizing that equality. Jefferson made 
such a speculation, and significantly he conceived of the relationship 
between equality and mind as one which was quite opposite to the stated 
charge of the adversary position:
That mind could be thought to make a principle of 
inequality would once have bewildered any man of good 
will and advanced views. Jefferson thought that it was 
virtually of the essence of mind that it pointed toward 
equality, and his system of education had the specific 
goal of countervailing the power of property by the 
power of ideas, which he assumed to be accessible to 
all men equally.89
But it is precisely here in the claim that mind makes for equality 
that the difficulties and complexities of the issues of equality begin. 
In holding that "it was virtually of the essence of mind that it pointed 
toward equality," and that mind contains the power of "countervailing 
property," Jefferson formulated a metaphysical conception of mind which 
he thought would implement the unconditioned progress of democracy.
This opposition between mind and property which he found in the circum­
stances of his time is quite naturally the consequence of his particular 
situation, and not necessarily a dichotomy which can define the meta­
physical conception of mind or property. Trilling shows the insuffi­
ciency of the Jeffersonian conception of mind by establishing an analogy
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supplying a paradoxical sense of mind, which makes it seem extravagant to
hold, as Jefferson did, that mind in its essence points toward equality:
Yet we must see that whatever inherent antagonism 
there may be between ideas and property, they are 
not in all respects dissimilar. Between ideas and 
one form of property, money, there is actually a 
close analogy to be drawn. At a certain point in 
history money began to play a part in society which 
can be thought of as ideational— in England in the 
late Renaissance, in a society in which the aristo­
cratic land-owning class was prepotent, money had a 
disintegrating effect upon the nation's class structure 
and hence upon its moral and intellectual assumptions.
. . .  It was the ever-growing power of money that 
proposed and propagated equality as a social ideal.
And then, to carry the analogy further, it can be said 
of ideas that they are, like money, a mobile and 
modilizing form of property. They are, to be sure, 
accessible to all and held in common, but as they come 
to have power in the world, it is plain that a peculiar 
power or, at the least, status accrues to the individuals 
who first conceive them, or organize them, or make them 
public. Men of ideas, perhaps even more rapidly than 
men of money, move toward equality with men of birth.
Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot appear on the eight­
eenth-century scene as sovereign princes of intellect.
What the contradictions and paradoxes of Jefferson's formulation 
indicate is that any abstractions such as these must be qualified by 
the experience of circumstances and of history. Taken as a philosophical 
formula, independent of the dialectic of history, Jefferson's con­
ception is an interesting speculation, but it is only that. And> of 
course, if it holds that Jefferson's ideas are sufficient only in the 
world of abstractions, it follows that any statement derived upon the 
same basal abstraction is subject to the same criticism.
The achieved social status of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot does 
not make for, Trilling points out, the kind of equality which "Jefferson 
meant when he spoke of ideas as making for equality, nor was it what 
the French Revolution meant when it emblazoned the word on its banners."
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Jefferson and the French revolutionaries held to the notion of 
equality as an abstraction, an. unconditioned ideal of equity among 
men. But the conditioned equality of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot 
was "all that established society was ready for." It was an equality 
which Napoleon approved of, when he proclaimed his maxim, ,M-Careers 
open to talents, *11 and for post-revolutionary France, it was "a quite 
significant, even a bold, definition of social equality." In England, 
such a conception of conditioned equality brought great progress to 
democracy, and Alexis de Tocqueville, "the great historian of the modern 
ideal of equality and its developing force in the world," admired England 
over his native France for the success with which the country realized 
the egalitarian ideal. There, as a man of humble birth rose from "simple 
origins to wealth, status, and influence through his talents and efforts 
alone, beholden to no one," so also could a man of mind "follow the same 
course." The extraordinary examples of Michael Faraday, Thomas Carlyle, 
and Charles Dickens became paradigms of nineteenth century democracy.
And as their legend of glory became known, even ordinary men were allowed 
to have careers in society.^
Hence, England established a powerful social dialectic of democracy 
in which mind in its aggressive and authoritarian energies played a 
dominant role. People understood that this was not equality, the equal­
ity which Jefferson and the French revolutionaries aspired after, but 
that "it was equality of opportunity," or conditioned equality. It was 
an equality admired by Tocqueville because "it seemed so effectual a 
means of preventing the revolutions which plagued France." And for 
Carlyle and Ruskin, the great stewards of nineteenth century democracy, 
such equality was a satisfactory resolution. Never in all "their
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impassioned demands for social justice" did they criticize the practical
conception of equality which was accommodating so many and working so 
72
well in England. It becomes evident then that the great democracies
of the nineteenth century achieved an equality which, because of its
conditioned character, would not be acceptable to either Jefferson, who
understood mind to make for an absolute equality, or to those of the
adversary proceeding who see mind as an impediment to absolute equality.
But the great social reformers were content with that limited equality
which mind enabled men to gain in European society. It was only at the
end of the nineteenth century that men once again became interested in
the intense egalitarianism of Jefferson and revolutionary France.
In 1876, it was Matthew Arnold, of all people, who complained in
a lecture before the Royal Institute of the low status to which the
notion of equality had fallen. And like Jefferson, "he saw the cause
of equality as being best served by the improvement and spread of the
education available to the lower-middle and working classes." Yet the
English resisted this idea, and it is only recently that Arnold's idea
73"has become an avowed national purpose."
In America, where the conception of an unconditioned equality has 
not encountered as much resistance, higher education inspired by the 
Jeffersonian notion of equality "has spread among the population at 
an ever-accelerating rate," and the nation has found this flourishing 
of education among the population reassuring "of its commitment to 
equality," except, of course, until the past decade.^
But if one examines what has happened to the university in the 
past few years, one can perceive that a new impulse for unconditioned
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equality emerging in American culture is now bringing confusion into 
contemporary life, and one can also understand how, under the influence 
of the adversary proceeding, the university, once a brilliant embodi­
ment of the kind of dialectical democracy found in the nineteenth century,
is becoming the political instrumentality of a group who are not so
much interested in equality as they are in actualizing a philosophy of 
intellectual nihilism.
The university in America has always been an institution which has
followed the spirit of the dialectical democracy of nineteenth century
Britain. To a limited degree, it has always provided a "successful means
of upward social mobility,"^ while at the same time it remained loyal
to the transcendent purposes of mind. Of the once esteemed traditions
of the American universities, Trilling writes,
Everyone was perfectly aware of their being a way to
social advancement, but much of the complex interest
they had for the American people, much of the esteem and 
even affection in which they were held, derived from 
the purposes of general enlightenment and humanization 
which they claimed, from their conceiving themselves 
to be in the service of disinterested mind.
But this tradition of the university, in which an individual achieves 
respect, admiration, and authority through his intellectual accomplish­
ments, is now considered an aberration of democracy. "Indeed, in some 
quarters, it has given place to a view which holds that higher education 
is one of the citadels of social privilege /emphasis mine/.^ The 
consequences of this view are that the whole idea of the intellectual 
life in the university is now subordinated to the unconditioned idea of 
equality. The university, formerly an institution comprehending in 
complex dialectic both the social and intellectual ambitions of men, 
is now being transformed into a agency of democracy which has for its
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purpose the single aim of bringing a formal equality to people. Of
the plight of the universities, Trilling observes sadly:
They may still claim, though they do so ever, less 
often and less firmly, that they are in the service of 
those ideals which are announced by the Latin mottoes 
on their corporate seals, ideals of "light" and "truth," 
but it is increasingly believed that their real duty is 
to enable as many people as possible to pass from a lower 
to a higher position in society. 78
For Trilling there is no denying that there exists an inequality 
in the universities, although he understands that inequality as some­
thing emerging from circumstance rather than malicious human intention.
"If higher education," he tells his readers, "is, among other things, 
an institutionalized means of upward social movement, it must be reco­
gnized that many members of our society are debarred from its process by 
reason of an ever more galling circumstance of their disadvantaged
position, a limited acculturation and an early schooling of extreme in- 
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adequacy." So it is not so much the charge itself which is disturb­
ing to Trilling, but something external to the charge; it is the conduct 
of those who seek to resolve the problem. And, as it turns out, it is 
the federal government, which falls tinder the critical gaze of Trilling. 
Under the auspices of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
the government has sought to correct the supposed inequity which many 
believe to be inherent in the traditions of the universities. Trilling 
objects in particular to a directive issued by this governmental agency 
in which it was decided "that institutions of higher education which 
receive government funds shall move at once toward bringing a statistically 
adequate representation on their faculties of ethnic minority groups.
Though Trilling endorses the directive in its "general and ideal goal," 
he does not write approvingly of the policy by which this aim is to be
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accomplished. That policy, he points out, is addressed to the
achievement of an immediate and adequate representation of minorities
without the least concern for its effect upon "standards of excellence
of the academic profession." '
Hence, the great dialectic of the university, which was once the
matrix of intellectual accomplishments and of a limited social mobility,
is now being dissolved in favor of certain popular values of sociological
import. The universities, having been accused of failing in "their
equalizing function, are now being transformed into agencies of "social
accreditation." Their continued existence and their formal justification
as institutions is now "wholly defined by the function in which they
82
have been said to fail." The new direction which they have been vir­
tually ordered to take is toward the pursuit of unconditional equality, 
and they are commissioned to achieve this goal even to the extent of 
rejecting their former allegiance to "light" and "truth" for their newly 
defined function.
The extremity of this policy, Trilling fears, will bring "serious 
adverse consequences," which "will be felt not within the academic com­
munity alone, but within the cultural life of our society as a whole,
not least, we may be sure, by that part of it to which the disadvantaged
83ethnic groups will themselves look for sustenance." Of course, one 
knows precisely what Trilling is saying here, if one remembers how
strongly he has emphasized the need for "prime Wisdom" in the actual 
living of life. A society by devaluing the general intelligence which 
obtains from the dialectical pursuit of "truth" and "light" deprives 
all of its citizens of the sense of a whole existence, of integrity of 
human purpose. Hence, Trilling interprets the strong measures taken
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to bring an egalitarian state within the academic community as 
self-defeating, when of course that state of equity is achieved 
through the sacrifice of intellectual standards. As a university is 
a place where the general intelligence should be able to grow and 
prosper, any effort which lessens the intensity of that life ultimately 
affects the intelligence of the communal good.
In dealing with the first charge of the adversary proceeding,
Trilling therefore makes an effort to recognize whatever cogent elements 
are contained within the position. Trilling does not deny that the 
university fosters an intellectual life out of which comes, as Thoreau 
would say, "a natural and irresistible aristocracy in every society," 
more influential upon mankind than "kings and emperors."®^ But given 
the inevitability of distinction which naturally follows from intellec­
tual accomplishment of this kind, Trilling sees whatever other class 
distinction said to exist within the university as something which is 
engendered by external causes, as social and cultural circumstance.
And though he acknowledges that some social measures should be taken 
to correct the evils attendant upon such inequality, he urges his
audience to look hard and long at the changes which are now being im­
plemented in the university for the redressal of inequality:
Yet if we consider some of the assumptions on which
the effort of redress has so far been made by our
society through its government, we must see that they 
constitute telling evidence of that uneasy or ambivalent 
or actually disaffected relation to mind which has come to 
mark our culture.®-*
Trilling's efforts henceforth will be seen in "his unmasking," as it might 
be said, of what actually lies beneath the surface of these new polit­
ical actions. What he uncovers there is not at all flattering, and yet 
it cannot be said to be unanticipated.
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The suggestion that a political ideology may be disguise for 
another human motive has come up before in the discussion which 
Trilling makes of William Morris's News from Nowhere. There it was 
pointed out that the avowed interest which Morris showed was in actuality 
only a nominal interest. Indeed when one examines very closely what he 
required for his utopia, it could be argued that his society, which in 
no way tolerated the life of the mind, was rooted in a covert wish to 
escape responsibility, pain, authority, and aggression attendant upon 
the life of mind. Given the validity of this interpretation, it follows 
that whenever a society is possessed of a strong egalitarian impulse, 
there often can be said to exist, not far behind, a strong and unyielding 
hostility to mind.
Hence in the egalitarian spirit which is found in such directives
as those of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Trilling
finds adverse attitudes toward mind. And as the university is "a hier­
archy of persons" who carry out "the enterprises of mind" and who "in the 
instutionalized training of the mind" make judgment upon others in degree 
of proficiency and accomplishment," 0 it becomes a matter of inevitability 
that such an institution will be looked upon by those of the egalitarian 
persuasion as an archaic and vestigial survival of the old dialectical 
democracy of the nineteenth century.
The fate of the university in contemporary culture is symbolic and 
illuminative of what underlies the egalitarian impulse of the adversary 
proceeding. As the university is singled out from so many institutions 
in American culture to be the subject of a powerful and shaping impulse
of egalitarianism, it becomes evident that the traditional academic
standards are being changed not for the achievement of a perfect equality
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but rather for the extirpati.cn of mind. The aggression and authority 
of mind, which once characterized a series of brilliant dialectics in 
nineteenth century democracy, is now being renounced in favor of a 
democracy whose citizens are no longer made anxious by the sacrifice and 
discipline required in the life of mind.
In the attitudes of those who are in the academic profession, 
Trilling finds the most telling evidence that men have become tired of 
the demands which mind makes upon their energies in the aggressive 
expression of ideas. The intellectuals of the universities no longer 
wish to shape their own thoughts and visions upon a world of social 
circumstance and intractable matter. They offer no resistance to the 
overzealous agencies of government who have invaded their once sovereign 
ground. Under the pressure of popular opinion which calls for them 
to abolish their once treasured academic traditions and standards of 
excellence, they are passive, silent, and even worse, indifferent.
As Trilling observes:
The diminished morale which marks the academic 
profession in its official existence is, we may suppose, 
of a piece with the growing intellectual recessiveness 
of college and university faculties, their reluctance 
to formulate any coherent theory for higher education, 
to discover what its best purposes are, and to try to 
realize them through the requirements of the curriculum.
And no observation of the decline in academic confidence 
can leave out of account the effect of a tendency which 
of recent years has established itself within the 
academic community, among teachers as well as students, 
the ideological trend which rejects and seeks to dis­
credit the very concept of mind. This adversary posi­
tion is now highly developed and its influence is of 
considerable extent.^7
Trilling finds the first charge of the adversary proceeding to 
be rooted in a misunderstood ambiguity. In charging that mind makes 
for inequality, those of the adversary proceeding fail to distinguish
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between the abstract order of Ideas and the existential order. In 
other words, the ideal of equality is of an abstract character and 
as such is formulated solely as an unconditioned vision of life. But 
as men seek to make that idea practical, to individuate it, it quite 
inevitably falls short of its original essence. It becomes conditioned 
by circumstance, by personality, by the very dialectic of existence, 
an. inescapable part of human fate, an inexplicable given of existence. 
Mbreoever, the human mind, even in its most democratic and emancipatory 
moments, advances itself through the distinguished efforts of individual 
men and hence quite naturally disruptive of the felicity which an 
egalitarian society seeks.
Another difficulty which Trilling finds in this same charge has also 
to do with the character of abstract ideas. One of the chief dangers 
of such an unconditioned formulation as "mind makes for inequality" 
is its malleability as a political emotion. Frequently an idea of 
this kind can become a rationale for a hidden, even unconscious, motive 
or at least a motive which is vaguely experienced within the human psyche. 
While the abstract and theoretical formulations of egalitarian democracy 
are not without validity, Trilling finds behind the idea of a world of 
perfect equality a profound desire to escape the painful powers of mind.
Trilling then discontinues his discussion of the first charge upon 
which mind is impeached and turns his attention to the other major 
criticism of mind held by the adversary proceeding. That charge, it 
will be recalled, accuses the mind of having a deforming effect upon 
the human person. The charge has a certain specificity and formality 
about it, since, as Trilling points out, its strictures are represented 
by the pejorative phrase "the myth of objective consciousness," a term
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coined by Theodore Roszak. The myth of objective consciousness,
Trilling explains, "is held to be pre-eminently responsible for the 
dehumanizing tendency of our culture. It is said that objectivity 
has come to control and pervert our mental life through the agency of 
technology, which has established as a model of mental process in general 
the quite special psychology implicit in the method of science."89 
It is science, then, and the methods of science which generate the 
hostility, which occasions the second charge of the adversary proceed­
ing against mind.
This charge against mind is confirmed in two very negative effects 
which science has actually wrought in human life. And interestingly, 
these two effects, as they are used to support the charge that mind de­
forms human personality, are identical with those of the romantics, 
"except that they are more extreme." The first effect of "objective 
consciousness" is its constricting influence upon human perception.
Here the method of science devalues the autonomy of an-object by pre­
venting it from being apprehended in its "full integral being." From
the point of view, any object, human beings included, is to be perceived
90only in "abstract and quantifiable terms."
The second and more formidable effect which mind is accused of 
having upon human nature has to do with the perversion of the human 
spirit. Under the sway of a psychology of mind which insists that all 
human faculties be subordinated to the one faculty of abstract cognition, 
the human psyche, now virtually a slave to abstraction, does violence 
to its own self: "Joy becomes ever less available to us; our natural 
impulse of sympathy with our fellow men and the universe we inhabit is 
thwarted.
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Trilling obviously finds a measure of cogency in the criticism 
upon which the second charge against mind rests. Indeed he can be 
said to show sympathy with this aspect of the adversary proceeding.
In Emerson's expressed attitude toward science, Trilling finds a pro­
found metaphorical description of what the technology of modern science 
was doing to the world even in the nineteenth century. In 1856 Emerson 
wrote of a "terrible machine" which was possessing itself of the ground, 
the air, men and women, and even becoming a threat to thought. Trilling 
quotes Emerson to give substance to this second charge of the adversary 
proceeding, and, obviously approving of that criticism, he follows 
Emerson's observation with his own comment on the matter: "The conscious­
ness that some alien power has taken possession of human existence is now 
of the very substance of our life in culture. In one or another degree
we all share it, we all are aware of some diminution which technology
92
works upon our humanity."
Yet Trilling would argue that the adversary proceeding has in fact 
exaggerated the problems which the "objective consciousness" of science 
has brought in contemporary life. It is not objectivity itself, but 
the unconditioned notion of objectivity which brings distress in the 
spiritual and intellectual life of contemporary times. Modem scientists, 
endorsing objective consciousness as the sole means of knowledge, are the 
ones to be impugned for a blind and inhuman allegiance to a single method 
of mind. Against the conditioned ideal of objective consciousness, Trilling 
places into contrast the conditioned notion of objectivity as it "has 
been traditionally understood." Acknowledging the psychological and moral 
hazards of "objectives consciousness," he goes on to say: "But when we 
have given this much assent to the common characterization of the mental
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life of our time, we must see that what distresses us has nothing 
whatever to do with the intellectual ideal of objectivity as that 
has traditionally been understood and striven f or. Trilling there­
fore defends objectivity as something quite different from the objective 
consciousness of science. Objectivity is not an invention of science,
nor does it seek to limit human perception, nor does it devalue its
94object of perception, nor is it ultimately reductive in function.
Objectivity, as it has been traditionally understood, has its
genesis among the romanticists. It was they who first encountered the
divisive and dehumanizing powers of mechanistic science. It was they
who sought to integrate the abstract and subjective elements of mind
into a single human experience. And it was they who understood better
than contemporary thinkers that the abuse of the objective powers of
mind does not warrant the rejection of objectivity itself.
Matthew Arnold, accepting the legacy of his romantic predecessors,
assimilated and defined the romantic position on objectivity. His
definition of objectivity, Trilling contends, is "the simplest and the
best." For Arnold objectivity is the effort'" to see the object as in
itself it really is."' And for Trilling this means that "the aim of . . .
objectivity is the fullest possible recognition of the integral and
entire existence of the object."^
As such Trilling suggests objectivity is a necessary prelude and
part of a dialectical moment of perception when a person views "a
phenomenon of nature, or a work of art, or an idea or system of ideas,
or a social problem, or, indeed, a person" in freedom from his "habitual
thought, to our predilections and prejudices," and "casual or hasty 
96inspection," Objectivity as the first element of dialectical
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perception does not exclude what is necessary for the completion of
that experience— the subsequent affects of mind and person toward the
object as something to be admired, or loved, or sympathized with, or,
as the case often is, detested. About this non-exclusive aspect of
objectivity Trilling writes with emphasis:
This way of seeing the object, as something we move 
toward or away from, even as something we wish to 
destroy, is not precluded by the ideal of objectivity, 
which requires only that, before the personal response 
is given, the effort to see the object as in itself if 
really is be well and truly made.9'
Hence traditional objectivity has its own defined limits. Unlike the
objectivity of science, it does not claim that its knowledge of the
world rests on absolute certitude. In contrast to the unconditioned
objectivity of science, objectivity is understood by those vdio practice
it to be "an effort which can never wholly succeed.
In speaking of objectivity as "effort," Trilling is, of course, 
introducing a neglected aspect of mind. His choice of words here is 
deliberate and illuminating because it casually broaches a subject which 
is seldom discussed in intellectual circles: the concept of "intel­
lectual honor." As "the effort" of traditional objectivity "must always 
fail,"— for reasons having to do with the nature of individual persons, 
of society, and "of mind itself"— it would seem that those who seek to 
practice objectivity do so under the burden of a sense of inevitable 
defeat. But that is not the case, so Trilling argues. The very limita­
tion of the effort of objectivity, as it is acknowledged by those who 
practice it, engenders "something like a sense of intellectual honor" 
and a faith "that in the practical life, which includes the moral life,
Q Q
some good must follow from even the relative success of the endeavor.
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The patience, the humility, the moderation required of such 
objectivity has never made it attractive to men. Moreover, the dis­
position of men today toward such a deliberate moral attitude of mind 
is rejected in favor of a new concept of authenticity which "stipulates 
that only those things are real, true, and to be relied on which are 
experienced without the intervention of rational thought."^® And so 
again, Trilling implies, mind is impeached not really because it per­
verts human perception or because it does injury to the human psyche, 
but rather because men are loath. to suffer the disciplining and abstemious 
nature of mind.
This positive rejection of mind Trilling sees as flowing from "the 
contemporary ideology of irrationalism," which celebrates the immediacy 
of experience and perception over and against rational mind. In describ­
ing this vision of mind as "irrationalism" he implies that a new philoso­
phy of mind has arisen in contemporary culture which endorses noncognitive 
experience with the same intolerance and absolutism as eighteenth-century 
rationalism apotheosized reason over every other kind of human experience. 
But if "irrationalism" is to be recognized as a cultural event of new 
significance in contemporary society, the motives behind it are not new. 
Irrationalism seeks the immediacy of experience with "means" that are not 
"new": "They include intuition, inspiration, revelation; the annihilation
of selfhood perhaps through contemplation but also through ecstasy and
101
the various forms of intoxication; violence; madness." So that the 
perennial availability of these "old means" is indicative or symptomatic 
of the kind of motive which antecedes ideology. And that motive, as 
Trilling has shown in the "enchanting romance" of William Morris, is 
the old Adam, or the eternal desire of the human heart to escape the 
aggressive and authoritative dialectic of mind.
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"The impulse to transcend rational mind," Trilling writes in
the concluding paragraph of his confirmatio, "would seem to be very
deeply rooted in man's nature." Even before the anthropologists
taught men "not to despise or condescend" to this impulse, the most
accomplished and creative artists and philosophers appreciated its
102
value and sought to realize its meaning through various means.
But before the modem period no thinker or artist ever apotheo­
sized this aspect of the human psyche. They understood it to be one 
of the constants of human nature. It was recognized formally as the 
Dionysian aspect of human personality, and as such it was considered 
to be a psychic force which was productive of insights about man and 
the world. But it was always subordinated to reason, or at least 
related to reason as one of the elements of or terms in the dialec­
tic of artistic perception.
The phenomenon of madness, as it was treated by Plato, Shakes­
peare, Cervantes, Nietzsche, and Yeats illustrates this point. Of 
madness and its significance as the matter of art in the works of 
these artists, Trilling observes:
Madness, for example, figures memorably in the work of 
Plato, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Nietzsche, and Yeats, all 
of whom represent it as a condition productive of truths 
which are not accessible to our habitual and socially 
countenanced mode of perception and constitute an adverse 
judgment upon it.^^
Thus the manner in which these thinkers and artists shaped the material
of madness was "of the profoundest and most cogent import." Madness
for them was not mere "figure of speech" but something more than "a
metaphorical construct." Yet Trilling observes of artists' treatment
of madness that'no one ever supposes them to be urging it upon us that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
128
madness, because of the heuristic and moral powers . . .  Is a state
of existence which is to be desired and sought for, and, as it were,
socially established."^^
Yet today, "it has become possible to claim just such credence
for the idea that madness is a beneficent condition, to be understood as
the paradigm of authentic existence and cognition." In one of the oldest
institutions of civilization and society, the medical profession— and
in that section of it which is dedicated to curing such pathology of
the mind— there are those who claim that madness, far from being an
aberration, is a self-liberating and salutative condition of mind. Trilling,
in giving account of this new therapy, refers to it as coming from "a
notable section of post-Freudian psychiatric opinion with wide influence
in intellectual community." Although he does not mention the names of
specific psychiatrists, he is actually alluding to the theories of R. D.
Laing and David Cooper. But, about madness and their opinion of it,
he is quite specific and accurate:
The line is taken that insanity is directly related to 
the malign structures and forces of society, not as a 
mere passive effect but, rather, as an active and 
significant response to society’s destructive will.
Insanity is represented as a true perception appro­
priately acted out— society itself is insane, and when 
this is understood, the apparent aberration of the 
individual appears as rationality, as liberation from 
the delusion of the social madness.105
This eccentric and absolutistic vision of life, so far removed 
from Trilling’s conception of dialectic and conditioned reality, does 
not evoke any detailed response from him. Once again Trilling allows 
the insufficiency of the position to speak for itself. His only res­
ponse is a succinct statement upon which the confirmatio is ended and 
in which he establishes once more the fact that contemporary culture
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devalues mind. "The project," he concludes, "may be taken as the 
measure of how desperate Is the impulse to Impugn and transcend the 
limitations of rational mind. But his brevity here is intended to 
suggest how symbolic and illuminating is this adverse judgment upon 
mind which is now being made by representatives of one of the greatest 
institutions of modern civilization. In assenting to a mode of be­
havior which diminishes the value of mind, Trilling is suggesting that 
the institution of medicine is suffering the same plight which he finds 
in the university. But whereas the devaluation of mind in the university 
seems to come about from a passive and almost unconscious desire to escape 
mind, the learned doctors of psychiatry are formally rejecting mind in 
favor of what was once considered to be the aberration called madness.
The fourth and final section of the oration, denominated by Cicero 
as the peroratio, is always devoted to a summary of the entire lecture.
And clearly this is Trilling's intention as he begins his peroratio by 
generalizing about his efforts in the former parts of the lecture:
In what I have said this evening I have tried to 
canvass the situation in which mind stands in our nation 
at the present time. My emphasis has been on the 
vicissitudes of the situation, on those circumstances 
of several kinds which might be thought to limit a free, 
general participation in the activities of mind or to 
baffle its intentions and fatigue its energies."
But Trilling's intention takes him beyond mere summary, and he 
explains in later sentences of the peroratio:
In describing some of the special vicissitudes which 
at the present time attend the right conduct of mind, it 
has not been my intention to suggest that these, though 
disquieting, are overwhelming. I have not meant to say 
that mind, in Wells's phrase, is at the end of its
tether. ^-08
Trilling therefore wishes to dismiss any impression that he, as an
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elder statesman of American literature, is disheartened about the 
future of mind in the modem world. If, in earlier sections of the 
lecture, one finds a melancholy, autumnal tone, it is here dissipated 
as Trilling shows that he has not the least intention of becoming "the 
aged eagle."
The first point which Trilling makes in the peroratio is that 
confidence in mind has not always been a consciously held attitude 
among men. Indeed, looking at the past from a general historical per­
spective, "it is difficult to say what part mind has played in the life 
of nations." When one examines the life of a nation, it is difficult 
to say how and at what point in the development of a nation, "the 
conscious and self-conscious mind" can be spoken as being "the most 
salient" force,in a national destiny. This is because much of what one 
terms a nation's life is diffused in the many agencies of government, 
and habit, inertia, old pieties and class interests obscure the historical 
operations of intelligence. Moreover, intelligence is revealed only 
in "moment," and most of what one defines as intelligence is perceived 
in the practical acts of men; as a result this very practicality of 
intelligence obscures the high quality of mind behind the act. As 
Trilling describes this difficulty: "And intelligence, which, in the 
degree to which it is effectual, is probably more than simply prac­
tical."109
However, in one time in history, Trilling discerns a specific 
cultural development in which "there would seem to have developed some 
obscure unarticulated idea that mind, in the sense in which I have been 
speaking of it, ought to have a place in the national enterprise."110 
This cultural event took place four hundred years ago, in Renaissance
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mEngland, when the aristocracy became interested in education. This 
new interest in education among the aristocrats was of such an un­
precedented character that it has commanded the attention of the dis­
tinguished historian J. X. Hexter, who has written an essay devoted 
to the social phenomenon of "the sudden movement of the aristocracy and 
the gentry into the schools and the two universities."^^
In earlier times, these schools, "formerly the preserve of boys 
and young men of the lower classes," provided the opportunity for social 
ascendancy as clerks and priests of Church. But in the sixteenth century 
these schools became flooded with young aristocratic gentlemen who,
alongside of their once exclusive interest in "manners and grace," now
112deigned to become scholars and knowing men.
This "essence of mind," which the aristocracy suddenly discovered
and wished to cultivate, survives on to this day and is known as "the
mystique of mind." One knows and recognizes it when it is spoken of
mind under the aspect of "energy," of "intentionality," of "impulse
toward inclusiveness and completeness," of "search for coherence," and
of "looking before and after." So much is taken into the phrase "mystique
of mind," so much of what are considered the abstract and particular
elements of mind, that the phrase must be understood here as represent-
113ing mind as dialectic.
The "inarticulate intuition" which came upon the. aristocracy of
sixteenth century England is of monumental significance because it
heralds the ascendancy of mind in the affairs of the modem nation-state.
Trilling evaluates its significance when he says:
With the passage of time that dim perception has 
achieved a fuller consciousness— we now judge societies
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and their governments by the same criteria we use in 
estimating the rightness of the conduct of mind. We 
judge them by their energy, their intentionality, their 
impulse toward inclusiveness, by their striving toward 
coherence with due regard for the integrity of the dis­
parate elements they comprise, by their power of looking 
before and after.
The revolutionary impact of this cultural phenomenon can be understood,
Trilling continues, by recognizing how the relationship between mind
and society has been reversed since the time of Plato: "Plato, when he
undertook to say what the right conduct of mind should be, found the
paradigm in the just society. We reverse that procedure, finding the
115paradigm of a just society in the right conduct of mind."
It is when one contrasts the attitudes of citizens of contemporary 
civilization with the received standard of the sixteenth century that 
one experiences a "disquieting feeling." Yet Trilling is quick to remind 
his readers that disquietude is not to be equated with despair. More­
over, he continues, the very dialectic of history which teaches men to
"look before and after," should remind them of how much a part error is 
in the life of reason:
Seen in its totality, seen historically, the life of 
the mind consists as much in its failed efforts as in
its successes, in its false starts, its mere approx­
imations, its very errors. It is carried on, we may 
say, even in the vicissitudes it makes for itself, in­
cluding its mistrust or denial of its own ideal nature.
All these are manifestations of the energies of mind, 
and William James, a philosopher in whose peculiar 
largeness of spirit we may perceive an affinity with 
Jefferson’s, was at pains to remind us that they, in 
all their ill-conditioned disorder, are actually a 
function of mind’s ideal achievement.
And it is just at this point that Trilling affirms with perfect clarity
and finality his commitment to the dialectical vision of mind: "Mind does
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
133
not move," he writes, "toward its ideal purposes over a royal straight
road but finds its way through the thicket of its own confusions and
contradictions."'*'^ There is then, for Trilling,no royal road, no Rue
Espirit Geometrie, of mind, but only that famous symbolic thicket of
dialectic found in the Marriage of Heaven and Hell.
And for this reason alone, if for none of the others, Trilling
urges men to walk circumspectly as they see mind drawing "back from its
own freedom and power, from its own delight in itself." With such
deliberation, with such achieved awareness, Trilling suggests that his
lecture will not be considered as "counsel of despair," but rather a new
affirmation of an innate power of mind, the power of dialectic as it is
experienced in the wish of the human mind to become "conscious of it-
118self . . .  to examine a course it has taken and to correct it."
As the last and final point of the peroratio, Trilling urges that 
his readers always keep this vision of the dialectical life of mind 
before them as they "make judgment of a culture." Not that the ideal 
purposes of mind, those matters of mind associated with "order, in­
clusiveness and coherence" are to be forgotten. On the contrary, Trilling 
would have men remember the inevitability of error so that they will not 
despair of the ideal order which mind seeks to realize. What he wishes 
men to experience is disquietude and not despair as they understand that 
"within the intellectual life of the nation, and not of our nation alone,"
there has come about "a notable retraction of spirit, a falling off in
119mind's vital confidence in itself."
And while it is true that the dialectical vision of history teaches 
men that the history of mind "has never been a bland continuity," and 
that the past indeed shows periods "when mind shines forth with special
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luminosity and periods when it withdraws into the shadows," the 
circumstances of today do require that men be vigilant, that they 
keep before them a certain "disquietude." As heirs to the Jeffersonian 
legacy, Americans should be conscious that "mind, far from being orna­
mental," is part of "the superstructure of society," and that, as a 
consequence of this identification of mind with national purpose, "any
falling off of its confidence in itself must be felt as a diminution
120
of national possibility, as a lessening of the social hope."
The final sentence of the peroratio comes as something of a surprise 
to the reader. Whereas the concluding sentences of the exordium, the 
narratio, and the confirmatio all contain a note of sadness and resig­
nation about the fate of mind, this final sentence of the lecture is in 
essence an act of affirmation. It is a long, circuitous path which one 
follows before arriving at the heart of the issue of Mind in the Modern 
World. It is this circumspection, this holding back of a quick and easy 
judgment, which, if it is tormenting to the reader, nonetheless teaches 
him the power and the discipline of the dialectical vision of reality.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
NOTES
CHAPTER V
^Lionel Trilling, Mind in the Modern World (New York: The 
Viking Press, 1972), p. 41.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 40.
4Ibid., p. 4.
5Ibid.
8Ibid., pp. 4-5.
^Lawrence A. Sasek, "The Drama of Paradise Lost, Books XI and 
XII,” in Milton: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. by Arthur E. Barker 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 342-356.
8Trilling, Mind in the Modern World, p. 5.
9 Ibid., p. 6.
1QIbid.
n ibid.
12Ibid.
13Ibid.
14Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 7.
16Ibid.
Ibid.
18Ibid.
19Ibid.
135
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
136
20lbid.
21Ibld.
22Ibid., p. 8-9.
22Ibid., p. 9.
24Ibld.
25Ibld.
26Ibid., pp. 9-10.
27Ibid., p. 10.
28Edward P. J. Corbett, Classical Bhetorlc for the Modern 
Student, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 303.
2^Trilling, Mind in the Modern World, p. 11.
30
Ibid., p. 39.
33John Milton, Areopagitica in The Students' Milton, ed. by 
Frank Allen Patterson (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, Inc., 1961), 
p. 738.
32Trilling, Mind in the Modem World, p. 11.
33Ibid., p. 12.
34Ibid.
35Ibid.
36Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38Ibid.
39Ernest Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1944), p. 9.
40Trilling, Mind in The Modem World, pp. 12-13.
41Ibid., p. 13.
42Ibid.
43Ibid., p. 14.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
137
44Ibid., pp. 14-15.
43Ibid., p. 16.
46Ibid.
47Ibid., p. 17.
4 8 Ibid.
49Lionel Trilling, Preface to The Opposing Self (New York: The 
Viking Press, 1955), pp. IX-XV.
■^Trilling, Mind in the Modern World, p. 17.
^Matthew Arnold, "The Function of Criticism at the Present 
Time,11 in Criticism: The Major Texts, ed. by Walter Jackson Bate (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952), pp. 464-465.
•^Trilling, Mind in the Modem World, pp. 17-18.
•^ Ibid., p. 18.
54Ibid.
^Ibid., pp. 18-19.
56Ibid., p. 19.
57Ibid., p. 21.
58Ibid., p. 19.
59Ibid.
^®Fred Weinstein and Gerald Platt, The Wish to be Free (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 20-21.
8*Trilling, Mind in the Modern World, p. 20.
62
Ibid., p. 21.
63Ibid., p. 20.
84Freud Sees the intellect as being gentle rather than aggressive. 
See Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion (New York: Doubleday and Co.,
1964), pp. 87-88.
^Trilling, Mind in the Modern World, p. 20.
8^John Milton, "Lycidas," in The Student’s Milton, p. 40.
87William Blake, Stanzas from Milton, in Lionel Trilling, The 
Experience of Literature (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 
1084.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88Martin G. Kalin, The Utopian Flight from Unhappiness (Chicago 
Nelson-Hall, 1974), p. 136.
69'Trilling, Hind in the Modern World, p. 21.
70Ibid., pp. 21-22.
71Ibid., p. 23.
72Ibid., p. 23.
73Ibid., p. 24.
74
Ibid., p. 24.
75_, . ,Ibid.
76Ibid., p. 25.
77Ibid., 24.
78Ibid., p. 25.
79Ibid., p. 26.
80Ibid., p. 27.
81Ibid.- 
82Ibid., p. 25.
88Ibid., p . 25.
8V n r y David Thoreau, Walden, in The American Tradition in 
Literature, 3 rd ed., ed. by Scully Bradley, et al. (New York: Grosset 
and Dunlap, 1967), p. 1311.
85' Trilling, Mind in the Modem World, p. 26.
88Tbid., p. 30.
87Ibid., pp. 29-30.
88
Ibid., p. 31.
89Ibid., pp. 31-32.
90Ibid., p. 32.
91Ibid.
92Ibid., p. 33.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
139
93Ibid.
94Ibid.
95Ibid.
96Ibid.
97Ibid., P- 34.
98Ibid.
"ibid.
100Ibid., P- 35.
101Ibid.
102Ibid.
103Ibid., pp.. 35-■36
104Ibid., P* 36.
105Ibid.
106Ibid., P- 36.
107Ibid., P- 37.
108Ibid., PP . 39-■40
109Ibid., P- 37.
110Ibid.
111Ibid., P* 38.
112Ibid.
113Ibid., P- 39.
114Ibid.
n5T,.,Ibid.
116Ibid., P- 40.
117Ibid.
118Ibid., P- 41.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
140
1:L9lbid.
120lbid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CONCLUSION
The whole effort of this dissertation has been directed toward 
establishing the critical methodology of Lionel Trilling. The very 
character of such an aim requires that one deny himself the pursuit of 
any other aspect of Trilling’s criticism, no matter how interesting the 
other aspects of his work might be. Yet, if Trilling’s work is to be 
appreciated as a whole, the laborious, often dull task of formulating 
his critical stance is quite necessary. It enables the reader to appre­
ciate the continuity of Trilling's thought as it is present within par­
ticular essays and in his writings in general. In fact, it so puts things 
in such perspective that one is able to appreciate other aspects of his 
work without losing sight of the general purpose.
There is in Trilling's criticism a charm, a dignity, and an elegance 
that can be distracting, unless one keeps before himself the serious, 
even perhaps religious, intention which suffuses his criticism. Like 
Arnold, Trilling sees the poet and the artist as gaining the ascendency 
of a moral teacher in a world in which the priest, minister, and rabbi 
seem no longer to be the dominant source of man's spiritual life. Hence 
the critic, as steward of literature, always has a moral purpose in the 
sense that he wishes to make men think deeply about the values of lit­
erature as they touch upon the life of the spirit. It is neither by 
chance nor rhetorical art that Trilling ends one of his last and greatest 
works with a religious metaphor. In the last chapter of Sincerity and
141
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and Authenticity, Trilling discusses the work of the Freudian revi­
sionists, Hebert Marcuse, Norman Brown, David Cooper, Michel Foucault, 
and R. D. Lang. He has many reservations about their work, and takes 
great pains to demonstrate the insufficiency of their vision of man, by 
defending psychoanalysis as Freud first conceived it. (It might be added 
that Trilling presents here one of the most moving and convincing de­
fenses of the thought and purposes of Freud ever written.) But he ends 
the chapter on a note of dismay, not about what the Freudian revisionists 
have done with Freud, but about the attitude of the "educated public" who 
have received these changes with facile acceptance.
Those who accept the newly proclaimed doctrines do so without any 
kind of resisting thought, without dialectic. They are quick to identify 
themselves with the mad Christ of whom Laing speaks as existing in every 
man, but they do so, or wish to do so, without any of the "inconveniences" 
of being a Christ, of engaging in the dialectic of spirit, "with none," 
Trilling observes, "of the inconvenience of undertaking to intercede, of 
being a sacrifice, of reasoning with rabbis, of making sermons, of having 
disciples, of going to weddings and to funerals, of beginning something 
and at a certain point remarking that it is finished."^ The religious 
metaphor of this ending sentence characterizes "the high seriousness" of 
Trilling’s. If one is to appreciate this quality of his work as it shapes 
his criticism into a unified vision, then how important it is to know what 
Trilling’s critical methodology is, no matter how dreary the process of 
defining it is.
And such a methodology can be derived by isolating three themes 
or conceptions which appear in Trilling’s writings often enough to be
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considered the central ideas of his methodology. These are, as has 
been shown, the notion of the imagination as the most comprehensive 
and profound faculty of knowledge, a human facility which perceives 
reality through a dialectical union of instinct and reason; next, the view 
that culture, which originates in the human imagination, is also dia­
lectical, and that when it loses this dialectical quality, it degenerates 
into ideology; and,thirdly, the valuation of the romantic tradition as 
the source and originating point of what has been called elsewhere in 
this dissertation, "the dialectical sense of reality." Each of these 
subjects is always present in Trilling's work; they are, so to speak, 
"categories of his thought" without which Trilling's criticism cannot be 
understood.
In the preface to the Liberal Imagination, Trilling writes in some 
detail about the imagination as the imagination. He is interested in the 
imagination as the faculty by which men come closest to truth. To the 
imaginationhe attributes a power of dialectic which draws together the two 
worlds of man. These two worlds are the world within man and the world 
without man. The world within man is the immediate, personal world of 
man, the world of feelings and instincts; the world outside of man, which 
is perceived most acutely as reason is developed in man, is the whole 
natural universe, and the world of the cultural milieu of time, place, 
and people. In the dialectic of the imagination, these two worlds are 
interfused, and this for Trilling constitutes reality. Because the 
modality of the imagination is dialectical, its purposes can never be 
atrest,any more than one can conceive of both the internal and external 
world of man as being in stasis. No sooner does the imagination achieve 
a dialectical synthesis of human experience than it is confronted with
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
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a task of creating another dialectic. In Trilling's vision of the 
world, much as in Blake's marriage of heaven and hell, human per­
ception is not one event but an infinity of events in which the imagi­
nation humanizes the world by interpreting it as a dialectic between 
instinct and reason.
The second conception which comprises a basic idea of Trilling's
methodology is his notion of culture. In the preface to The Opposing
Self, Trilling discusses the historical circumstances in which men first
grew aware of their autonomy through the power of the imagination. "There
have always been selves, or at least since the oracle at Delphi began to
advise every man to know his own. And whoever has read European history
at all knows that the self emerges (as historians say) at pretty frequent
intervals. Yet the self that makes itself manifest at the end of the
eighteenth century is different in kind and in effect from any other self
2
that had ever before emerged." The distinguishing aspect of this self 
which emerges at the end of the eighteenth century lies in "its intense 
and adverse imagination of the culture in which it had its being."
The consequences of the birth of this "adverse imagination" is a new 
conception of society as a dialectic of culture. Trilling explains:
"And by this act it brought into being not only itself but also the idea 
of culture as a living thing with a fate of its own with the possibility, 
and the necessity, of its own redemption."^ Culture achieves its "redemp­
tion" through the maintenance of its dialectic, and it can only accomplish 
this by receiving the dialectical impulses of the imagination. Whenever 
a culture becomes absolutistic and removed from the creative energies of 
the selves which constitute it, it is an ideology. And this can happen 
to any culture, even a culture as brilliant as the early adversary culture.
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In the preface to Beyond Culture, Trilling studies the fate of 
the romantic tradition— he calls it the adversary spirit or culture—  
as it continues on into the twentieth century. In this preface, it 
becomes apparent that Trilling allies himself to the romantic tradition, 
although he expresses great apprehension about the ideological qualities 
of the work and thought of those who make claim as representatives of 
the tradition. And although Trilling makes it quite clear that roman­
ticism is now afflicted with the kind of decadence associated with ide­
ology, it is apparent that he thinks its original philosophical and 
aesthetic premises are valid ones and pertinent to the life of the spirit. 
He is telling his readers this when he writes in the preface, in obvious 
reference to the early adversary culture of the nineteenth century,
"that the primary function of art and thought is to liberate the individual 
from the tyranny of his culture in the environmental sense and to permit 
Trim to stand beyond it in an autonomy of perception and judgment."^
Here, one finds the third idea which constitutes Trilling's methodology.
For though Trilling writes many harsh things about the present develop­
ment of romantic culture, he is still obviously committed to the dia­
lectical metaphysics of the imagination and of culture and the roman­
ticism which originated these notions.
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CONCLUSION
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